Peninjauan Kembali oleh Jaksa

oleh Binziad Kadafi

UU No. 16 Tahun 2004 tentang Kejaksaan baru saja diamandemen dengan UU No. 11 Tahun 2021. Ketentuan yang banyak disorot adalah pemberian kewenangan kepada Jaksa untuk mengajukan peninjauan kembali (PK). Pasal 30C huruf h UU tersebut mengatur: “Selain melaksanakan tugas dan wewenang… Kejaksaan:… h. mengajukan peninjauan kembali”.

Kritik disuarakan. Argumennya adalah pertentangan ketentuan tersebut dengan putusan MK, di samping ketentuan itu dianggap akan membuat suatu perkara pidana tidak berujung. Kontroversi lama hidup kembali.

PK oleh Jaksa dalam perundang-undangan

PK sendiri baru dikenal dalam hukum nasional lewat UU 19/1964 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman dan UU 13/1965 tentang Mahkamah Agung. Meski hanya mengintroduksi PK secara umum, kedua UU tersebut mendelegasikan pengaturan lebih lanjut pada hukum acara.

Lantaran pemerintah dan DPR tidak kunjung melahirkan hukum acara, MA berinisiatif mengisi kekosongan hukum. Perma 1/1969  dan Perma 1/1980 yang diterbitkan MA mengatur bahwa PK terhadap putusan pidana yang berkekuatan hukum tetap harus diajukan oleh terpidana atau Jaksa Agung.

Jaksa Agung dapat memohonkan PK bagi terpidana yang telah meninggal dunia, juga ketika terdapat salah satu alasan PK yang dikenal saat itu: “adanya putusan pidana di mana suatu perbuatan pidana dinyatakan terbukti, namun tanpa diikuti oleh pemidanaan”.

Akhirnya pada 1981 pemerintah dan DPR berhasil mengesahkan Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (KUHAP). KUHAP dengan asas akusatornya (yang menempatkan terdakwa sebagai subyek), membawa dua prinsip baru terkait PK.

Prinsip pertama, pemajuan hak individu saat berhadapan dengan negara. PK menjadi hak terpidana atau ahli warisnya (sesuai Pasal 1 angka 12 dan Pasal 263 ayat (1) KUHAP). PK juga harus menguntungkan terpidana (isi putusannya tidak boleh memberi konsekuensi lebih berat dari putusan asal).

Prinsip kedua, perlindungan terhadap finalitas putusan bebas dan lepas. Putusan bebas dan lepas tidak dapat dimintakan banding, kasasi atau PK (meski dalam prakteknya dan berdasarkan sebuah putusan MK, putusan bebas masih bisa dikasasi).

Melalui dua prinsip tersebut, pembentuk KUHAP seperti sengaja mengecualikan hak Jaksa untuk mengajukan PK.

Namun paradoksnya, KUHAP juga memuat Pasal 263 ayat (3), bahwa PK dapat diajukan terhadap putusan yang menyatakan suatu dakwaan terbukti namun tanpa disertai pemidanaan. Ketentuan tersebut tidak termasuk 3 (tiga) alasan PK dalam Pasal 263 ayat (2), yaitu: novum; putusan saling bertentangan; dan kekhilafan hakim atau kekeliruan yang nyata.

Ini lah yang kemudian menimbulkan kerancuan. Jika KUHAP mengecualikan hak Jaksa memohonkan PK melalui Pasal 1 angka 12 dan Pasal 263 ayat (1), lalu mengapa KUHAP juga mengatur Pasal 263 ayat (3), yang seolah merupakan alasan PK yang diperuntukkan bagi Jaksa?

Ditambah lagi, UU Kekuasaan Kehakiman 1970 mengatur bahwa PK diajukan oleh “pihak-pihak yang berkepentingan”. Menurut sebagian kalangan, “yang berkepentingan” dalam perkara pidana ada dua, yaitu: (1) terpidana atau ahli warisnya; dan (2) Jaksa yang mewakili kepentingan negara.

PK oleh Jaksa dalam praktek hukum

Ambiguitas norma di atas menjadi alasan kenapa Jaksa tetap mengajukan PK. Paska KUHAP, PK pertama kali dimohonkan Jaksa pada perkara Muchtar Pakpahan. Jaksa berhasil menganulir putusan bebas Pakpahan di kasasi, hingga dipidana 4 tahun penjara oleh Majelis PK (Putusan No. 55 PK/Pid/1996).

PK oleh Jaksa juga dikabulkan MA terhadap putusan bebas Ram Gulumal (Putusan No. 3 PK/Pid/2001) dan putusan lepas Soetyawati (Putusan No. 15 PK/Pid/2006). Sementara di perkara Pollycarpus Budihariyanto (Putusan No. 109 PK/Pid/2007), PK Jaksa dikabulkan MA dengan memperberat pidana di kasasi.

Pertimbangan putusan Muchtar Pakpahan banyak dirujuk putusan yang menerima dan mengabulkan permohonan PK Jaksa. Pertimbangan tersebut juga terefleksikan dalam PK yang menganulir putusan bebas Joko S. Tjandra (Putusan No. 12 PK/Pid.Sus/2009).

Majelis PK berargumen: (1) ada aturan tentang hak Jaksa mengajukan PK, meski tidak jelas; (2) hakim dapat menafsirkan ketentuan UU yang tidak jelas; (3) hukum acara, meski bersifat imperatif, dapat dilenturkan; dan (4) kepentingan negara, umum, terdakwa, dan korban harus diseimbangkan.

Menariknya, di banyak perkara lain MA mengusung sikap tidak menerima PK oleh Jaksa. Dalam perkara Mulyar bin Samsi (Putusan No. 84 PK/Pid/2006) dan Anggodo Wijoyo (Putusan No. 152 PK/Pid/2010), PK Jaksa tidak diterima karena UU tegas menentukannya sebagai hak terpidana atau ahli warisnya. Menurut Majelis PK, itu merupakan bentuk “due process of law” guna membatasi tindakan negara terhadap warganya.

Kadang MA tidak menerima PK Jaksa karena pertimbangan berbeda. Dalam perkara Roedyanto (Putusan No. 57 PK/Pid/2009) dan Ahmad Kudri Moekri (Putusan No. 173 PK/Pid.Sus/2011), Jaksa dinyatakan tidak mampu menunjukkan kepentingan publik yang harus dilindungi dengan permohonan PK-nya.

Sesungguhnya perdebatan mengenai PK oleh Jaksa telah ditutup ketika MK melalui Putusan No. 33/PUU-XIV/2016 mengabulkan permohonan uji materiil Anna Boentaran, istri Joko S. Tjandra, terhadap Pasal 263 ayat (1) KUHAP. MK menyatakan Pasal tersebut tidak mempunyai kekuatan hukum mengikat sepanjang dimaknai berbeda dari norma yang tersurat. Tidak seorang pun, termasuk Jaksa, dapat memohonkan PK kecuali terpidana atau ahli warisnya.

Sejak Putusan MK tersebut, tidak ada lagi PK oleh Jaksa. Selain tidak dapat diajukan oleh Jaksa, MK dalam pertimbangannya juga menegaskan bahwa PK tidak dapat dimintakan terhadap putusan bebas atau lepas.

Perbandingan dengan Belanda

Mari kita membuat perbandingan dengan Belanda. Negara itu layak ditilik karena Indonesia mewarisi sistem PK-nya yang telah berubah sesuai konteks di sana.

Awalnya putusan bebas di Belanda juga dilindungi dengan finalitas absolut. Argumentasinya, tidak adil jika negara dapat terus menuntut warga negara, termasuk melalui PK, setelah yang bersangkutan bebas dari dakwaan (Van Hattum, 2012).

Namun argumen tersebut hanya persuasif bagi terdakwa yang memang tidak bersalah. Sama sekali tidak persuasif bagi pelaku kejahatan yang lolos dari jerat hukum lewat penipuan dan intimidasi (Miller, 1927).

Butuh waktu lama hingga PK terhadap putusan bebas diadopsi di Belanda. Meski sudah dibahas kalangan ahli hukum sejak 1873, baru pada 1 Oktober 2013 hal itu diakui hukum acara pidana Belanda. Yang berhak memohonkan adalah Procureur General (PG), melalui prosedur super ketat, hanya dengan alasan novum dan falsum.

Novum dalam PK terhadap putusan bebas dibatasi berupa: (1) pengakuan kredibel terdakwa yang bebas dari tuduhan pembunuhan, bahwa dia pelaku sesungguhnya; atau (2) hasil penelitian teknis berupa ‘hard evidence’ mengenai kesalahan terdakwa.

Sementara falsum adalah kejahatan yang mencemari lahirnya suatu putusan bebas. Falsum terdiri dari: (1) bukti palsu; (2) keterangan palsu; (3) kejahatan terhadap pejabat atau individu yang terkait dengan suatu proses pidana; atau (4) hakim yang disuap.

PG juga berwenang mengajukan PK bagi terpidana dengan kriteria tertentu. PG dapat membantu terpidana mencari bukti dan memperkuat argumentasi jika terdapat alasan untuk memohonkan PK (Brants & Field, 2011).

Namun patut dicatat, PG tidak sama dengan Kejaksaan. PG mengepalai sebuah kantor di Mahkamah Agung Belanda (Hoge Raad) yang bertanggung jawab menuntut tindak pidana yang dilakukan pejabat publik, serta menyampaikan pendapat kepada Hoge Raad atas setiap perkara kasasi. PG juga mengajukan kasasi demi kepentingan hukum, termasuk mengajukan permohonan PK.

Apa yang sebaiknya dituju?

Lalu apa yang hendak dituju lewat Pasal 30C huruf h amandemen UU Kejaksaan? Melihat berbagai persoalan dalam praktek PK, perubahan kebijakan yang lebih mendasar layak jadi tujuan. Sekadar mengatur kewenangan jaksa mengajukan PK mungkin tidak berarti banyak, malah potensial menimbulkan benturan norma. Sistem PK di Indonesia perlu dibahas ulang secara utuh dan visioner, berpijak pada kondisi empirik, perkembangan hukum, serta prinsip dan doktrin yang relevan.

Untuk itu amandemen KUHAP perlu digulirkan, di mana ruang keterlibatan para pemangku kepentingan, terutama ahli hukum, perlu disediakan secara luas. Sebab di KUHAP lah diatur berbagai pilar PK, mulai dari syarat formal, alasan materiil, hingga prosedur. Apabila sistem PK di dalam KUHAP didesain dengan baik, niscaya akan tercipta sistem peradilan yang berprinsip, yang putusannya akurat sekaligus berkepastian.

Dimuat di Harian Kompas, Sabtu, 11 Juni 2023, hal. 6.

Mendesain Ulang Peninjauan Kembali

Binziad Kadafi

Anggota Komisi Yudisial RI. Pengajar Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Indonesia Jentera

Apa yang ada di benak ketika kita mendengar frasa luar biasa? Rasanya siapa pun akan membayangkan sesuatu yang eksklusif, istimewa, berbeda dari yang lain, atau mengesankan. Pada konteks ini, menarik untuk membahas Peninjauan Kembali (PK) yang merupakan upaya hukum guna memeriksa ulang putusan pidana yang telah final (berkekuatan hukum tetap) berdasarkan alasan yang sangat terbatas.

Tidak hanya pendapat ahli hukum, peraturan perundang-undangan menyatakan PK merupakan upaya hukum “luar biasa”. Lalu, apa betul PK bersifat luar biasa? Bagaimana jika PK justru menghasilkan keadaan yang tidak sejalan dengan atribut luar biasa?

Praktik PK di Indonesia

Ketimbang menjadi eksklusif, Mahkamah Agung (MA) pada kenyataannya selalu kebanjiran perkara PK. Pada 2020, misalnya, 7.341 permohonan PK masuk ke MA untuk berbagai jenis perkara. Pada perkara pidana saja, permohonan PK sepuluh tahun terakhir sejumlah 400-an per tahun (MA, 2021). Alih-alih didasarkan pada alasan istimewa, MA pernah mengungkap hanya 20 persen permohonan PK, alasannya layak.

Tingkat keberhasilan PK selama bertahun-tahun itu hanya sekitar 12% (MA, 2016).

Alasan PK yang banyak dipakai pemohon: “kekhilafan hakim atau kekeliruan yang nyata”. Alasan ini memang paling lentur dibanding alasan lain (novum dan putusan saling bertentangan). Karena lentur, alasan kasasi yang sudah ditolak pun dapat dikemas ulang sebagai kekhilafan hakim di PK. Mungkin itu sebabnya, mayoritas PK yang diajukan adalah terhadap putusan MA sendiri di tingkat kasasi.

Daripada dipandang sebagai proses yang berbeda dari yang lain, PK justru sering dipandang semata-mata sebagai upaya hukum ketiga. Sebagian kalangan bahkan memperlakukan PK sebagai pengganti banding biasa.

Dalam beberapa perkara pidana, terpidana memilih langsung mengajukan PK tanpa menempuh banding dan kasasi karena putusan PK tak akan memperberat putusan semula (peluangnya bebas, lepas, pidana lebih ringan, atau minimal sama).

Akibat tingginya arus perkara ke MA, hasil pemeriksaan PK di MA mungkin tak lagi mengesankan. Karena itu, bisa ditemukan putusan-putusan PK yang kadang justru mendatangkan masalah. Putusan berkekuatan hukum tetap yang bisa jadi sudah benar, menjadi rentan untuk diuji kembali oleh proses yang tak menjanjikan kualitas yang lebih baik.

Masalah konsistensi juga jadi sorotan dalam putusan-putusan PK. Ada putusan yang menerima permohonan PK kedua kali, sementara putusan lain tegas menyatakan PK hanya bisa dimohonkan satu kali.

Ada putusan yang mensyaratkan kebaruan dan sifat menentukan novum secara ketat, ada yang mengkualifikasikannya lebih longgar. Ada putusan yang kritis terhadap PK yang sengaja langsung dimohonkan tanpa melalui banding atau kasasi, ada yang tak beri catatan apa pun terhadap strategi litigasi itu.

Masalah kerangka hukum PK di Indonesia

Berbagai UU sejak dulu belum mampu membangun sistem PK yang baik. Padahal, PK merupakan salah satu mekanisme peradilan yang paling banyak diatur (highly regulated). Sejak diintroduksi pada 1964, PK diatur oleh 12 UU, 6 Perma, 12 SEMA, 2 SK Ketua MA, dan 1 Petunjuk Ketua Muda MA.

Namun berbagai peraturan perundang-undangan tersebut condong mengatur formalitas seperti subyek dan tahapan PK. Pembentuk UU kerap bergantung pada MA, yang memang paling menguasai aspek teknis, untuk mengelaborasi norma-norma PK. Sementara MA lebih kuat menjalankan peran itu lewat regulasi dan kebijakan, ketimbang yurisprudensi.

Regulasi dan kebijakan yang dihasilkan MA pun lebih dominan menentukan formalitas PK. Aspek yang substantif dan mendasar, seperti penentuan ruang lingkup dalam menguji setiap alasan materiil PK, belum cukup disentuh. Karena itu tidak berlebihan jika dikatakan kerangka hukum PK di Indonesia belum koheren dan konsisten. Situasi ini tentu memengaruhi advokat, jaksa, dan para hakim.

Para aktor peradilan ini belum dipandu peraturan perundang-undangan yang koheren dan konsisten (yang berpijak pada prinsip dan doktrin) dalam mengajukan, memeriksa dan memutus PK. Akibatnya, persoalan kualitas dan konsistensi mengemuka di perkara PK tertentu. Salah satu wujudnya adalah putusan MA yang dikritik pemerhati peradilan dalam dan luar negeri, termasuk putusan PK (Kompas, 16/11/2021).

Tawaran solusi

Di antara solusi yang bisa ditawarkan adalah kembali pada prinsip dan doktrin yang mendasari PK. Terdapat dua kutub doktrin yang berhadapan soal keberadaan PK. Ada doktrin yang mendukung, mengedepankan pertimbangan falibilitas bahwa hakim (begitu juga bukti-bukti) sangat mungkin salah (Franken, 2008).

PK oleh doktrin ini dinilai penting guna mengoreksi kesalahan serius (gross error) pada putusan pengadilan yang sudah final. Doktrin ini menjamin hak individu mendapatkan putusan yang benar (Craighead, 2003).

Di sisi lain, ada doktrin yang menentang PK dengan mengusung prinsip finalitas, bahwa proses peradilan harus ada ujungya (lites finiri oportet). Menurut doktrin ini, PK prosedur yang mahal, memakan waktu, dan duplikasi dari tahapan peradilan sebelumnya (Scott, 2014). Jika suatu putusan tidak kunjung dihormati karena tidak kunjung dianggap final, salah satunya karena setiap saat bisa diperiksa ulang lewat mekanisme PK, kewibawaan pengadilan akan terganggu, begitu pun kepentingan individu yang sudah diadili lewat putusan tersebut (Jacob, 1970).

Pijakan pada prinsip dan doktrin di atas akan mengantarkan kita pada dua fungsi PK yang setara. Pertama, mengoreksi kesalahan dalam putusan final. Kedua, melindungi finalitas putusan pengadilan. Idealnya kedua fungsi PK ini berjalan beriringan. Namun di Indonesia, dengan maraknya penggunaan alasan PK yang lentur, fungsi PK atas nama koreksi kesalahan lebih mengemuka daripada fungsinya melindungi finalitas putusan (terutama putusan final yang sudah diyakini benar). 

Pengadilan sesungguhnya dapat menjalankan kedua fungsi PK secara seimbang, dengan tak meninjau kembali perkara pidana yang telah diputus dengan putusan berkekuatan hukum tetap, kecuali jika: (1) ditemukan fakta baru yang mengubah konteks peristiwa pidana dalam perkara; (2) fakta itu mengantarkan pada penerapan ketentuan pidana yang berbeda; dan (3) finalitas putusan pengadilan yang ditinjau kembali tetap jadi perhatian dan dihormati.

Ketiga kriteria itu semestinya ada secara kumulatif dalam suatu permohonan PK. Tanpa ketiganya suatu alasan PK tidaklah faktual, tetapi hanya persoalan penerapan hukum (question of law). Jika faktual sekalipun, tanpa tiga kriteria itu, alasan PK tak signifikan untuk mengubah ketentuan pidana dalam putusan. Jika diteruskan, permohonan PK itu bisa mencederai finalitas putusan pengadilan dan menyinggung sensitivitas keadilan.

Andai peraturan perundang-undangan mensyaratkan ketiga kriteria ini dan pengadilan konsisten menguji dan menerapkannya, niscaya praktik PK akan lebih bermanfaat untuk membangun kepastian hukum dan keadilan melalui sistem peradilan.

Binziad Kadafi, “Mendesain Ulang Peninjauan Kembali”, Kompas, 4 February 2022, p. 6.

Biografi Singkat K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi

“Seandainya aku boleh memilih, biarlah aku menjadi bintang atau bulan yang tidak angkuh ketika bertahta, dan tidak mengeluh ketika terbenam. Biarlah aku menjadi sang fajar, yang gigih mengusir kelam, namun rela menyingkir untuk memberi tempat bagi sang surya yang lebih cemerlang.”

K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi

Lahir di kota Pemalang, Jawa Tengah, dengan nama Abdurrahman, pada 3 Desember 1944, dari pasangan H. Rois dan Hj. Munihah, K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi yang dikenal pula sebagai Arman Arroisi, menghabiskan masa kanak-kanaknya dalam latar belakang keluarga agamis. Ayahnya seorang pengusaha batik sukses kala itu, selain juga dikenal sebagai pemain sepakbola ulung. Sedang ibunya hanya wanita desa sederhana, cara berpikir maupun kehidupan keseharian.

Karena dekat dengan K.H. Thosim Hanafi, paman dari pihak ibu yang merupakan ulama berpengaruh di Pemalang, Arman Arroisi menjadi akrab dengan kehidupan pesantren. Walau keluarga menyadari bakat seninya besar, lantaran sejak SMP ia sudah banyak menulis puisi dan naskah drama, Arman tetap harus masuk pesantren. Langkah tersebut bukan malah menghalangi bakatnya, namun justru mempertebal kritik sosial dari setiap karyanya.

Terbukti memang cerita-cerita yang ia bawakan dalam setiap ceramah maupun tulisannya, sering diambil atau dikembangkan dari berbagai kisah dalam kitab-kitab kuning. Berbagai kisah tersebut banyak disampaikan K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi lewat seri buku 30 Kisah Teladan. Serial buku ini di masa terbitnya pernah dicetak ulang hingga 13 kali. Serial buku ini hingga sekarang masih dikagumi para pembacanya, antara lain melalui berbagai cuplikan dan review positif yang beredar di internet.

Menurut Arman, “didikan pesantren yang sangat merakyat membentuk pribadi berpembawaan sederhana dan tanggap pada fenomena sosial yang ada”. Tambahnya, “yang jelas, melalui pesantren, saya telah menjadi saya. Dan bagaimana pun kedudukan saya hari ini, apa pun yang telah saya capai saat ini, saya merasa bersyukur telah menjadi saya.”

Tidak sedikit kitab kuning yang ia lahap sejak masuk Pesantren Buntet Cirebon di bawah bimbingan K.H. Busyrol Karim, dan Pesantren Krapyak Yogyakarta langsung dibina K.H. Ali Maksum. “Beliau berdua adalah figur yang sangat berpengaruh dalam hidup saya.” “Kesederhanaan keduanya, di samping jasa yang tidak kecil bagi umat, patut saya tiru,” demikian kenang Abdurrahman Arroisi tentang kedua gurunya itu suatu kali.

Kematangan agamanya semakin bertambah setelah ia duduk di Fakultas Syariah IAIN Sunan Ampel, Surabaya, pada 1963, sebelum pindah ke Fakultas Tarbiyah IAIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim, Malang pada 1964. Dari situ wawasan sosialnya pun terdongkrak melalui berbagai aktivitas kampus yang ia terjuni. Arman Arroisi pemah terlibat dalam kepengurusan PMII, HMI, HSBI (Himpunan Seniman dan Budayawan Islam) dan Lesbumi (Lembaga Seniman dan Budayawan Muslim Indonesia).

Lewat forum HSBI dan Lesbumi ia sering mementaskan drama sebagai penulis naskah atau selaku sutradara. Banyak naskahnya menjadi unggulan lakon pentas para seniman Pemalang. Namun dari sekian banyak naskah drama yang dihasilkan, yang paling menggemparkan adalah lakon “Pesta Darah Rakyat.” Lakon itu mendapat sambutan hangat pada waktu dipentaskan dalam kongres IPNU-IPPNU se-lndonesia. Tercatat Imam Tantowi, sutradara kawakan yang menangani sinetron kolosal “Fatahillah” bersama Chairul Umam, juga acapkali mengangkat lakon-lakonnya ke atas pentas di Jawa Tengah.

Persentuhan Arman dengan dunia dakwah diawali di Jakarta ketika ia menempuh pendidikan di Akademi Teater Nasional lndonesia (ATNI). Hal ini dilatari oleh tantangan istrinya H.S. Romlah Adnan yang dinikahi pada tahun 1969, dan memang seorang da’i wanita, agar Arman mengamalkan ilmu agamanya dan menyampaikannya lewat media dakwah, bukan cuma berkutat di dunia pentas dan seni. Hal ini diperkuat lagi oleh dorongan abang iparnya, K.H. Hasyim Adnan, salah seorang pendiri Dewan Masjid Indonesia dan Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama.

Menggantikan abang iparnya, pertama kali ia berceramah di Masjid Al-Fudhlola Tanjung Priok, panitia yang mengundang agaknya kapok mendapati sang penceramah kurang siap. Pengalaman ceramah  kedua di Biro Pusat Statistik. Setelah didaulat menjadi imam sholat, ia kedapatan tidak terlalu lancar membaca doa dan zikir. Pihak yang mengundang maupun yang diundang sama kapoknya. Akhirnya ia memutuskan untuk setidaknya selama dua tahun menekuni kembali ilmu agama yang pemah diterimanya di pesantren, sebagai bekal saat kembali ke podium nanti.

Bakat seni dan akting disertai retorika dan artikulasi yang lancar, tidak membuat Arman Arroisi kesulitan menghanyutkan perasaan pendengarnya. Tak ada lagi yang kapok mengundang, malah banyak permintaan ceramah dari berbagai kalangan yang akhirnya tidak dapat ia penuhi seluruhnya.

Misinya paling besar di atas mimbar adalah membawa pencerahan dalam keberagamaan melalui cara yang halus, tidak menggurui. Juga sebagai juru damai dan penganjur toleransi, sebagaimana pesan Allah dalam kalimat yang tertulis tepat di tengah-tengah Al-Qur’an, yang sering dikutip Arman, “Wal-yatalatthof. Dan berlemah-lembutlah!” Tak heran jika jajaran direksi sebuah perusahaan asuransi nasional yang saat itu kebanyakan kristiani dan kebetulan direktur utamanya adalah seorang pendeta, setia mengikuti setiap kesempatan ceramah Arman Arroisi di perusahaan tersebut.

Dalam membawakan ceramahnya, sebagaimana mengantar kisah dalam buku-bukunya, Arman selalu jujur namun apik dalam mengemas. Tak jarang ceramahnya diselipi guyon-guyon khas NU yang mengundang gelak tawa, tak ayal juga ia ungkapkan cerita-cerita yang akan menguras air mata.

Sebelum pertama kali bukunya diterbitkan, karya K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi sudah sering muncul di beberapa harian ibu kota menggunakan berbagai nama seperti Arman Arroisi, Arman Haro, Putu Kalyubi, serta beberapa nama pena wanita. Masing-masing nama memiliki maksud dan sasaran. Untuk karya yang kental dengan pesan-pesan agama, ia gunakan nama Abdurrahman Arroisi dan Arman Arroisi. Nama Arman Haro dipakai bagi karya cerita agak populer. Sedang untuk kumpulan puisi, ia gunakan nama Putu Kalyubi, diambil dari nama kakeknya H. Kalyubi. “Putu” sendiri berarti cucu dalam bahasa Jawa.

Cerita silat bersambungnya banyak diminati oleh pembaca harian Suara Pembaruan yang memuat. Beberapa noveletnya juga disukai masyarakat luas, termasuk yang merebut juara II dan III sekaligus lomba fiksi Femina pada 1987, bersaing dengan Nadjib Kertapati.

Tulisannya yang berjudul “Langit Hitam Perempuan” yang dimuat di harian Pelita sebagai cerita bersambung, ternyata juga diikuti oleh kritikus sastra H.B. Jassin. Tokoh pujangga baru itu kemudian menghubunginya, menganjurkan agar karya tersebut diterbitkan sebagai novel, sekaligus berjanji memberi kata pengantar.

“Sebagai seorang pengarang yang juga pengarang cerita silat, Arman Haro nampak gayanya yang cerdas dalam melukiskan peristiwa-peristiwa serta tingkah laku dan jalan pikiran tokoh-tokohnya. Sangat menarik lukisan latar belakang beberapa pesantren di pulau Jawa dan pendidikannya. Kalau kita mau membaca di antara kalimat-kalimat, maka kita akan menemukan kecuali kritik-kritik sosial, juga sisipan-sisipan dakwah yang diselipkan dengan tidak mengganggu jalan cerita dan menambah pengetahuan pembaca tentang berbagai masalah ditinjau dari sudut penghayatan agama.” Demikian tulis H.B. Jassin di halaman muka novel “Langit Hitam Perempuan”.

Kerendahan hati Arman ditunjukkan lewat syair yang pernah dirangkainya sebagaimana dikutip di bagian awal tulisan, juga ketika menerangkan ke-kiai-annya. “Sebenarnya itu ulah penerbit. Untuk menambah bobot tulisan saya, mereka mencantumkan huruf KH di depan nama saya. Orang-orang mengira itu singkatan dari Kiai Haji, padahal lebih tepat jika dipanjangkan sebagai Kang Haji,” terangnya merendah.

Mungkin dengan melontarkan alasan seperti itulah ia jadi lebih leluasa ketika harus mengakrabi gadis-gadis pramuria untuk dijadikan inspirasi tulisan, hingga mengajak ke jalan yang benar tanpa membuat para gadis itu merasa didakwahi. Tanpa risih ia ceritakan pengalamannya di atas mimbar. “Jika mereka kita jauhi sebagai sekelompok orang tidak bermoral, mereka pun semakin jauh dari Tuhan,” ujar Arman.

Lantaran dalih di atas pula, K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi tidak perlu berpikir dua kali begitu Torro Margens, seorang sutradara senior, mantan anggota kelompok teaternya di Pemalang dulu, mengajaknya ikut andil dalam film nasional “Lukisan Berlumur Darah”. Kata Arman waktu itu, “Saya pilih peran Kapten Susilo, komandan satuan reserse. Sebab menilik dari script, cuma peran itu yang tidak harus pegang-pegang wanita.”

Yang jelas, ia tak pemah merasa terikat oleh atribut ke-kiaiannya dalam berkarya dan berdakwah lewat berbagai jalur yang mungkin ia masuki. Keterlibatan Arman Arroisi dalam perfilman terulang manakala salah satu cerita silatnya dari serial “Anak-anak Pendekar” berjudul “Ajal Sang Penyebar Maut” oleh Ratno Timoer diangkat ke layar lebar lewat judul “Syekh Siti Kobar Membangkang.”

Cara bertutur yang tidak menghujat, pengamatan berbagai masalah sosial secara mendalam, menyampaikan hikmah melalui berbagai kisah teladan, serta kemampuan berekspresi dan mengolah kata, bukan hanya dalam bahasa Indonesia, juga dalam beberapa bahasa asing, menarik simpati banyak kalangan untuk terus mengundang K.H. Abdurrahman Arroisi memberikan ceramah di berbagai kesempatan. Mulai dari jamaah umum, akademisi, para eksekutif, bahkan kaum birokrat. Mulai dari forum pengajian, seminar-seminar, atau berbagai acara kelembagaan.

Hampir seluruh pelosok nusantara telah dijelajahinya, negara-negara tetangga seperti Singapura, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Thailand, hingga Australia juga masuk dalam jangkauan dakwahnya. Hingga terakhir, masyarakat muslim Indonesia di Rusia dan Uzbekistan tak mau ketinggalan membahas berbagai masalah dari sudut pandang agama bersama Arman.

Arman Arroisi kerap menyayangkan betapa keberagamaan umat meski semarak secara lahiriah, namun memprihatinkan. Menurutnya banyak kecenderungan yang menganggap ibadah ritual sebagai tujuan akhir, hingga mengerjakan shalat pun sekadar terbebas dari kewajiban dan ancaman Tuhan. Hemat Arman pada satu sisi, kehidupan beragama yang formalistik memang memperoleh hasil setimpal, berupa ketaatan umat terhadap aturan-aturan syar’iyah. Akan tetapi pada akhirnya kepatuhan itu hanya sering tersisa di masjid, pada saat shalat, atau ketika pelaksanaan ibadah haji. Sementara peningkatan mutu mentalitas atau perilaku umat belum begitu tampak dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara.

Tulisnya dalam buku Refleksi Ajaran Tuhan sebagai berikut, “Konon, pejuang tampil untuk membela keadilan, termasuk mubaligh dan seniman. Namun, ketika keadilan menjadi isu, tiba-tiba keadilan berubah isi, sekedar jargon politik, dakwah, bahkan komoditi. Untuk mengundang penceramah yang pandai membahas keadilan, upahnya ratusan ribu bahkan jutaan rupiah. Sementara itu, anak-anak yatim, gelandangan, pelacur murahan, dan kaum lemah hanya terkagum-kagum mendengarkan kaset nyanyian, seminar, atau ceramah tentang nasib mereka. Kisah mereka disambut dengan gemuruh tepuk tangan. Hidup mereka tetap di tempat kumuh ke tempat lebih kumuh.”

Kepedulian sosial diwujudkan Arman melalui pembentukan Majlis Taklim yang diketuai istrinya, yang saat itu menyantuni ratusan anak asuh dan ratusan orang janda, bersama masyarakat. Prinsip yang selalu ia pegang, dakwah bil-lisan harus diimbangi dengan dakwah bil-haal.

Jabatan Dekan Fakultas Dakwah Institut Agama Islam Al-Aqidah yang pemah diembannya di saat K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) menjabat sebagai Rektor, menggambarkan kiprahnya selaku akademisi. Karir Arman sebagai wartawan mencapai puncak setelah ia menduduki jabatan wakil pemimpin redaksi majalah Amanah, bersama sastrawan besar seperti Ahmad Tohari dan Motinggo Busye di Dewan Redaksi. Namun dikarenakan kondisi kesehatan yang tidak mengizinkan, jabatan tersebut hanya dijalaninya selama kurang lebih dua tahun.

Kesetiaan terhadap profesi, sebagai seorang da’i, penulis dan budayawan adalah arti hidup Arman Arroisi. Tiga hari menjelang wafatnya, Arman masih menyempatkan diri berkutat di depan monitor komputer menyelesaikan materi khutbah idul adha yang sekiranya akan ia sampaikan di Al Markaz Al Islami, Islamic Centre Ujung Pandang. Selain itu ia juga masih punya tanggungan sebuah novel yang belum sempat ia beri judul.

Ada sebuah untaian puisi yang dituliskan Arman pada dinding triplek sebelah tempat tidurnya di suatu dini hari:

Untuk Ibu dan Anak-anak, dari Bapak

Tuhan,

tidurkan aku malam ini tanpa mimpi

dan seandainya telah tiba penantianku

jangan bangunkan aku pagi-pagi

aku ingin berbaring damai di sisi Mu

tanpa terganggu kenisbian waktu.

Jakarta, 10 agustus 1996

Puisi itu ditujukan kepada istri dan anak-anaknya, sebagai pengganti wasiat bagi mereka, saat Arman Arroisi menghadap sang Khalik pada 27 Maret 1997.

“Quo Vadis” Sistem Peradilan Perdata

Binziad Kadafi

Pengajar STH Indonesia Jentera; Kandidat PhD Tilburg Law School; Praktisi Hukum

Pada awal 2018, Mahkamah Agung menyampaikan secara terbuka Laporan Tahunan 2017. MA adalah satu dari sedikit lembaga yang konsisten melakukannya. Acara dihadiri Presiden Joko Widodo (Kompas, 1/3/2018). Pertama kalinya seremoni laporan tahunan MA didengar langsung kepala negara sehingga isinya lebih menarik untuk ditilik.

Dari ratusan halaman laporan, terdapat data yang sekilas sangat teknis hukum, tetapi memuat dimensi sosial yang luas. Data itu adalah jenis dan jumlah perkara pidana umum yang dimintakan kasasi ke MA sepanjang 2017. Di urutan teratas ada penipuan. Pada urutan berikutnya ada penggelapan. Setelah itu pemalsuan. Semuanya membentuk hampir separuh perkara kasasi pidana umum pada 2017. Fakta yang sama ternyata ditemukan di tahun-tahun sebelumnya.

Rumusan delik-delik itu beririsan dengan hukum perdata. Penipuan bisa ditemukan dalam Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) dan dalam konsep perdata. Sebagai salah satu alasan pembatalan perjanjian, penipuan harus dibuktikan secara pidana, tak cuma dipersangkakan. Mereka yang berseteru dan ingin membatalkan perjanjian perdata dengan pihak lain punya motif menggulirkan proses pidana penipuan.

Penggelapan adalah penguasaan terhadap aset milik pihak lain secara melawan hukum. Meski melawan hukum, menurut KUHP, terjadinya penguasaan aset tersebut bukan karena kejahatan. Perselisihan bisa memicu tuduhan penggelapan, yang merupakan tindak pidana, atas tindak penguasaan yang awalnya bersifat perdata.

Adapun pemalsuan menyangkut ketidakbenaran suatu surat yang jadi bukti atau dasar timbulnya hak, perikatan, atau pembebasan utang merupakan hubungan perdata. Jika ada konflik di hubungan tersebut, tuduhan pemalsuan bisa dipakai untuk mewarnai.

Data di atas mengindikasikan setidaknya dua hal. Pertama, kaburnya garis batas antara perkara perdata dan pidana, terutama dalam praktik. Kedua, kuatnya kecenderungan kriminalisasi sengketa perdata.

Problem peradilan perdata kita

Kedua indikasi itu sesungguhnya bukan hal baru. Daniel S Lev sudah mengungkapnya sejak lama (1966). Indikasi itu pun akan lebih bermakna jika dikaitkan dengan data lain, salah satunya hasil survei kemudahan berusaha Bank Dunia (2018). Dalam survei itu kemudahan berusaha Indonesia di peringkat ke-72 dari 190 negara. Namun, Indonesia masih ada di peringkat ke-145 untuk ”penegakan kontrak”, istilah Bank Dunia bagi sistem peradilan perdata.

Peradilan perdata kita dipersepsikan lambat. Butuh 390 hari untuk menyelesaikan gugatan di pengadilan negeri (PN) sampai eksekusi. Penyelesaian sengketa perdata juga dipersepsikan mahal. Butuh biaya hingga 74 persen dari nilai sengketa untuk menyelesaikan perkara hingga melaksanakan putusan perdata. Lebih umum, peradilan perdata masih dianggap kurang berdaya. Banyak hambatan agar putusan perdata bisa dilaksanakan guna memulihkan hak pencari keadilan.

Bermacam persepsi itulah yang sejak dulu menggiring pihak berperkara ke kantor kepolisian untuk melaporkan pidana lawan sengketanya (Gautama, 1979; Burns, 1980). Ancaman penjara dijadikan amunisi tambahan untuk memaksa lawan memenuhi kewajiban perdatanya. Kepolisian pun sulit menolak laporan pidana yang masuk. Akibatnya, proses pidana banyak menghantui proses perdata tentang persoalan yang sama. Padahal, ada kebijakan untuk tak memidanakan urusan perdata. Misalnya UU HAM yang melarang memidanakan utang atau peraturan disiplin kepolisian yang melarang polisi menjadi penagih piutang.

Memperkuat sistem peradilan perdata

Tulisan ini tak berpretensi melemahkan penegakan hukum, termasuk di ranah pidana. Penulis juga tak bermaksud menegasikan hak warga melaporkan tindakan yang nyatanya memenuhi rumusan delik.

Dibentuknya sistem peradilan pidana toh untuk menegakkan tertib hukum sekaligus melindungi masyarakat hukum (Remmelink, 2003). Sistem pemasyarakatan—terlepas dari berbagai masalahnya seperti overkapasitas lapas—berfungsi melakukan modifikasi, intervensi, dan memulihkan konflik di masyarakat (Sulhin, 2010). Tulisan ini lebih untuk mendorong pengambil kebijakan—pimpinan MA, presiden, dan lainnya—segera memperkuat sistem peradilan perdata yang masih kurang digunakan.

Jumlah gugatan perdata yang ditangani semua PN di Indonesia masih minim dibandingkan populasi pelaku usaha, apalagi jumlah penduduk Indonesia (Kadafi, 2016). Jumlah itu pun relatif stagnan selama beberapa tahun (MA, 2016, 2017, 2018). Padahal, di sisi lain pemerintah sedang menggeliatkan ekonomi di mana peradilan perdata seharusnya jadi tumpuan penyelesaian setiap potensi sengketa yang muncul dari sana.

Karena itu, berbagai persepsi negatif tentang sistem peradilan perdata harus dikikis habis. Untuk itu, MA pernah memperkenalkan mekanisme penyelesaian gugatan sederhana pada 2015 meski hanya bagi sengketa perdata di bawah Rp 200 juta. Mekanisme yang lebih sederhana itu ternyata disambut antusias. Jumlah pengguna meningkat puluhan kali lipat sejak awal diterapkan (MA, 2018).

Namun, publik butuh kerja lebih keras pengambil kebijakan dalam meyakinkan bahwa berperkara perdata itu bisa cepat, sederhana, berbiaya ringan, berdaya guna, dan bersih.

Jika sistem peradilan perdata berfungsi baik, tanpa harus membatasi penegakan hukum pidana yang sejatinya memang upaya terakhir (ultimum remedium), pendekatan kriminalisasi sangat mungkin ditinggalkan. Sebab, peradilan perdata dan putusannya bisa diandalkan warga dalam memulihkan hak-hak hukumnya sambil memaksa pihak berseberangan memenuhi kewajiban perdatanya.

Binziad Kadafi, ““Quo Vadis” Sistem Peradilan Perdata”, Kompas, 20 October 2018, p. 7.

Restoring Public Trust in Indonesia’s Courts

Binziad Kadafi

The Supreme Court conducted covert surveillance called ‘mystery shopping’ on various district courts in Jakarta and its surrounding areas in January.

The move received thumbs up from stakeholders. Chief Justice Hatta Ali and the Chairman of the Criminal Chamber, Artidjo Alkostar, said the initiative was aimed at verifying the integrity of the courts.

Such a field observation is common when it involves other institutions, but looks special when performed in the judicial environment. Why? Because it relates to public confidence, which, although cliche, is very important for the court.

Renowned legal thinkers such as Roscoe Pound have examined this issue since the last century. The Supreme Court is dependent on public trust because it has neither budgetary (purse) power like the legislative branch, nor the power of execution (sword) of the executive branch. The court simply relies on public trust for its rulings to be respected and enforced.

Public trust is a theme raised in official forums quite often. Different provisions in the judicial code of ethics endorsed by the court and the Judicial Commission in 2009 highlight the need to increase public and justice seekers’ trust in the judiciary power.

However, doubts over the Indonesian courts still linger among not only outsiders, but also members of the judiciary themselves. To have a basis for this assumption, empirical data needs to be put forward to support it.

One of the indicators could be the number of appeals filed with the Supreme Court. The blueprint for reform of the court says the lack of confidence in lower courts is one of the reasons for cases pouring into the court.

In 2016, the appellate courts settled 16,349 cases and the Supreme Court received 11,045 petitions for cassation.

This could mean that 67,5 percent of the litigants were dissatisfied with the decisions of the appellate courts and turned to the Supreme Court.

The number of case reviews can also be regarded as a signal of the deficit in public confidence. According to the annual report of the Supreme Court, 74,7 percent of the case review motions in 2016 were filed against the Supreme Court’s own decisions at the cassation level. A study once revealed that the main ground used for revision was a judge’s mistake and manifest error, which is closely related to the trust in a judge.

Public trust is determined by different perceptions about the courts. The more positive the public perception, the stronger public trust in the court.

When negative perception is rife, the court may face a crisis in public trust.

There are various data sources to find out how the public perceives the judiciary. The richest and most up-to-date source is the coverage of mass media. The courts and judicial proceedings are a constant and an appealing focus of media observations everywhere.

Another source is opinion makers’ statements, especially from civil society groups and scholars. Public complaints delivered through either formal channels or through alternative means should be regarded as a further source of data.

Similarly, various surveys of performance and court services – such as the integrity survey regularly conducted by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) on the public sector and studies performed by global institutions like the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business – could indicate levels of public trust.

Last but not least, the court’s rulings themselves are also an interesting source of data, since they are likely to contain the judges’ own assessment on the performance of other judges or the courts as a whole.

From the abundant data sources, different perceptions about the judiciary can be mapped and they have unfortunately not been very positive. A number of factors can be identified as negatively affecting public trust in the judiciary.

The first perception is the judicial process comes with a high price. Litigation in courts, especially in civil cases, costs a lot. Moreover, the services of lawyers are often generalized as part of the cost of judicial proceedings.

The second perception concerns the integrity of the judicial process. The gap between judges and their independence, according to various sources, is still mostly associated with bribery and brokering practices.

Third is inconsistency in court decisions, which causes legal uncertainty.

Fourth is the length of the litigation process. Although the Supreme Court has provided guidelines on the duration of case settlement, the ability of judges to comply with the timeline varies. Incentives to work swiftly and disincentives to drag feet on cases are not strong enough.

Fifth is an ineffective court decision. When a court’s decision is binding and irrevocable, the legal problem may not necessarily be solved because its execution encounters many obstacles.

Last is the limited quality of public services in court. One of the most highlighted aspects of a court’s public services are delays in court hearing schedules which may reach a few hours or even days.

For better or worse, the Supreme Court needs to be more open to input and periodically map out public perceptions of the courts. The mystery shopper method is merely one of the techniques and is certainly not enough.

Public perception is dynamic, depending on judicial performance and reform efforts. The perceptions may also be incomplete and their relevance might change overtime. The Supreme Court needs to direct each of its working units to be more sensitive to public perception and take them them into account in policy making.

From there on, the Supreme Court can start an analysis on who and which behaviors contribute to the negative perceptions about the court.

Finally, it is important to communicate this process to the public, as per the adage, “not only must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done”. Now is always the right time for the Supreme Court to restore public trust by addressing the negative perceptions through actions.

Although some are already been in place, they need to be more institutionalized by involving partners from both the state and civil society.

____________

The writer is a legal consultant and lecturer of Jentera School of Law who is pursuing a PhD at Tilburg Law School, the Netherlands.

The article was published in The Jakarta Post paper edition, on 29 June 2017, at page 6.

Download pdf here 2017-06-29 Binziad Kadafi “Restoring Public Trust in Indonesia’s Courts”

Paket Kebijakan Reformasi Hukum Jokowi

Binziad Kadafi
Pengajar Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Indonesia Jentera

Setelah meluncurkan paket kebijakan ekonomi, Presiden Joko Widodo berencana mengeluarkan paket yang sama di bidang hukum. Bermacam agenda besar disebut, seperti peningkatan kualitas aparat penegak hukum, perbaikan sarana-prasarana penegakan hukum, hingga pembentukan budaya hukum.

Namun yang menarik adalah keinginan Presiden meningkatkan kepercayaan publik pada berbagai institusi hukum. Sebab, dalam aspek ini akan mengemuka persoalan pelayanan hukum bagi masyarakat. Untuk mengkajinya, data di pengadilan menarik untuk dilihat.

Mari kita lihat gugatan perdata yang biasa dipakai untuk mengukur kepercayaan masyarakat pada pengadilan. Pada gugatan perdata, masyarakat secara sukarela membawa masalah hukumnya ke pengadilan untuk didengar dan diputus. Ini berbeda dengan perkara pidana kala masyarakat dihadirkan dengan upaya paksa penegak hukum.

Pada 2015, sebanyak 353 pengadilan negeri di seluruh Indonesia menerima 28.374 gugatan perdata. Jumlah tersebut sebenarnya sudah meningkat sejak 2014, yang bisa diklaim sebagai tanda mulai meningkatnya kepercayaan publik terhadap pengadilan. Sebelumnya, rata-rata gugatan perdata ada di kisaran 17 ribu perkara per tahun.

Jumlah itu, meski meningkat, harus diakui kecil. Rasio 28.734 gugatan perdata terhadap 57,8 juta pelaku usaha mikro, kecil, dan menengah (UMKM) di Indonesia hanya 0,05 persen. Padahal, UMKM merupakan kelompok masyarakat yang paling potensial membawa gugatan perdata ke pengadilan. Merekalah yang sehari-hari harus bertransaksi, dari soal produksi, distribusi, penjualan, hingga kontrak perburuhan. Semuanya berpeluang menjelma menjadi sengketa perdata.

Rasio gugatan perdata terhadap 258 juta penduduk Indonesia menjadi lebih kecil lagi, yakni hanya 0,01 persen. Dibanding negara tetangga, seperti Australia, rasio tersebut bisa mencapai 2,7 persen.

Data di masa lalu juga layak diajukan. Menurut catatan Barend Ter Haar, pada 1927 saja perkara perdata yang ditangani Landraad, pengadilan di masa Hindia Belanda bagi golongan pribumi, berjumlah 36 ribu setahun.

Dari situ bisa diartikan, ketika menghadapi sengketa perdata, masyarakat kita, termasuk para pelaku UMKM, cenderung pasrah. Menganggapnya semata cobaan Tuhan atau soal peruntungan. Sebab, jika harus membawanya ke peradilan perdata, kuat persepsi bahwa prosesnya akan panjang dan mahal, yang sesudah diputus pun tidak berarti banyak karena putusannya sulit dilaksanakan.

Jika punya waktu dan sumber daya, akan lebih menjanjikan membawanya ke ranah pidana, sambil berharap adanya ancaman penjara, yang akan memaksa pihak lawan memenuhi kewajiban perdatanya. Tren ini dikonfirmasi pula oleh data. Dari 1.750 perkara pidana umum yang masuk ke Mahkamah Agung pada 2015, sebanyak 40 persen merupakan jenis tindak pidana yang sangat mungkin berasal dari transaksi perdata, yaitu penipuan, penggelapan, dan pemalsuan surat. Akhirnya, penjara makin penuh sesak. Lemahnya mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa perdata ikut menyumbang penjara kelebihan kapasitas.

Memang, pengadilan kita adalah lembaga yang sangat sibuk. Begitu pula berbagai lembaga hukum yang bekerja dengannya, seperti KPK, kepolisian, kejaksaan, lembaga pemasyarakatan, dan profesi hukum. Setiap tahun tidak kurang dari 4,6 juta perkara yang mereka tangani.

Namun, jika dipilah, dari 4,6 juta perkara pada 2015, sebanyak 3,8 juta (84,5 persen) adalah perkara pidana cepat. Diperkirakan, 3,2 juta dari perkara pidana cepat itu adalah perkara tilang dengan menempatkan masyarakat sebagai tersangka pelanggaran lalu lintas ringan.

Bisa dibayangkan dampaknya jika 3,2 juta orang itu menempuh proses yang tidak jelas dan penuh calo. Cukup bercerita ke tiga orang saja, akan ada lebih dari 12 juta masyarakat Indonesia setiap tahun yang berbagi persepsi negatif tentang pengadilan, aparat penegak hukum, dan sistem hukum secara keseluruhan.

Apa relevansi semua itu dengan paket kebijakan hukum yang akan diluncurkan Presiden? Jawabannya cukup kuat. Salah satu yang penting, Presiden selaku pemegang kekuasaan tertinggi dalam pembinaan aparatur sipil negara bisa turut memastikan berbagai jabatan kunci di institusi hukum, termasuk MA, diisi oleh orang-orang yang peduli dan mengerti apa arti angka-angka di atas dan kaitannya dengan kepentingan masyarakat. Juga orang-orang yang selalu termotivasi meningkatkan kinerja lembaga, bukan yang abai dan justru membebani lembaga dengan perilaku tidak patut.

Berbagai inisiatif baik yang sudah dilakukan juga bisa terus didukung Presiden agar makin sempurna. Misalnya untuk mengikis persepsi negatif bahwa proses peradilan lama dan rumit, pengadilan sudah membentuk dan menjalankan mekanisme gugatan sederhana yang dalam 1 tahun sejak didirikan telah memeriksa 404 perkara di 124 pengadilan negeri yang mayoritas diputus kurang dari 25 hari. Persepsi negatif bahwa proses peradilan tertutup sudah lama dijawab dengan publikasi putusan yang saat ini hampir mencapai angka 2 juta.

Yang jelas, banyak tantangan untuk meningkatkan kepercayaan publik pada pengadilan dan lembaga hukum. Kebijakan berbasis data yang digodok secara partisipatif akan menjadi kunci keberhasilan jika digunakan sejak menentukan area-area yang harus dijamah pembenahan, merumuskan langkah-langkah rinci pembenahannya, hingga memantau pencapaiannya nanti.

Tulisan ini pernah dimuat di Koran Tempo, Kamis, 20 Oktober 2016, dan dapat pula diakses pada https://indonesiana.tempo.co/read/95322/2016/10/21/binziadk/reformasi-hukum-jokowi-binziad-kadafi

Download pdf di sini 2016-10-20 Binziad Kadafi -Paket Kebijakan Reformasi Hukum Jokowi

Dual Office Holding and the Role of Lawyer in Public Policy*

by Binziad Kadafi

“Having lawyers create laws is like having doctors create diseases”

Introduction

The above joke in the United States could be relevant to the topic of dual office holding by lawyer discussed in this article. Dual office holding by lawyer is a situation when a lawyer simultaneously holds an elected or appointed position to exercise some portion of sovereign power, conferred or defined by law, in addition to his/her legal practice. Dual office holding and primarily the potential conflict of interest in such situation, has long been attracting the attention of the legal community and members of the public in general, not only in Indonesia but also in other countries. But of course, the way each country approaches the dual office issue depends heavily on its own context. The issue can only be approached by tracing the historical factors of the legal profession, the surrounding political system, and other interrelated and interdependent factors, with the most important being the level of independence of the judiciary in each country.

In Indonesia, the discussions, debates, and even arguments during the parliamentary deliberation process of the Law No. 18 of 2003 on Advocates that focused too much on the dual office issue had proved to cover up other issues in the profession, which should have been considered no less important. During the deliberation process of the bill, various media gave more portions for reports on the debate whether the ban on dual office of lawyers should be regulated in the Advocate law or not.

Those facts lead to the question of whether the dual office issue deserves to be emphasized this much in the discussion about Indonesian legal profession? Again, the context is the key word in answering the question. Considering the minimum of compliance and the lack of enforcement of professional ethics; the remaining problems with the independence of judiciary; and the shift from “executive heavy” to a more “legislative heavy” power concentration; the tendency to view the issue of dual office holding as the main specter among other problematic issues surrounding the profession, can conditionally be accepted.

As a matter of fact, Article 3(i) of Indonesian Advocates Code of Ethics (Kode Etik Advokat Indonesia) has provided an answer regarding the dual office holding issue by stating that, “An advocate holding a public office, either in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of government is not allowed to continue his/her practice as an advocate nor to continue using nor to let others using his/her name in relation to the settlement of an ongoing case or lawsuit.”[1] However, due to the drawbacks encountered in the supervision and enforcement of the Code of Ethics by the Bar Association, the idea to regulate the dual office holding issue at a statutory level increasingly grows stronger. The idea was instigated partly by a number of incidents caused by the dual status maintained by some lawyers, being both professional advocate and public official.[2] Furthermore, the number of lawyers serving as public officials has been increasing,[3] including those serving as lawmakers who held the authority to deliberate the Advocate bill.[4] Therefore, it was understandable why many stakeholders worried that the interests involved in the discussion of the Advocate bill would make the regulation of dual office holding ineffective. As a direct consequence, the issue attracted more consideration than others.

Even after the enactment of the Advocate Law, the dual office holding issue continued to be contested. This article attempts to suggest that the debate needs to be conducted in a more proportional manner. Proportional means that it should not ignore other problems surrounding the profession, which deserve equal attention. Proportional also means that the debate on the dual office holding issue should not completely deny the long predicate of the legal profession being one of the best sources of capable people to fill certain public offices and roles. Based on this notion, it is essential for this article to beforehand present the historical facts of Indonesian advocates, especially their connection with public offices and roles, before moving forward to propose an appropriate solution to address the issue.

The History of the Contiguity of Indonesian Advocates with Public Offices/Roles

Different from other professions, almost everywhere advocates as professionals are taking on multifaceted functions. There are advocates who simply handle business contracts (beside notaries) or advocates who specialize in a certain field of practice such as criminal law, civil law, family law, and so on.[5] On the other hand, the profession has been frequently referred to as the main source of many special services needed by the society.[6] For instance, due to their comprehension of the structure, institutional settings, and the laws of the state, and due to their function in representing citizens in disputes against either state or other citizens, many regular advocates could finally take up an important role in politics themselves or engage in social matters, economy, education, and reform movements.[7]

One of the reasons to why advocates can play such a leading role is their flexibility to arrange and allocate their professional time.[8] Advocates are independent people having an independent source of income.[9] Many of them support, often financially, social and political activities that are not related to their practice, with resources allocated from their lawyering income.[10] Lastly, their legal education, combined with their wide concern regarding law, is able to instill deep engagement including ideas on state, not only on government, but also on nation-state.[11]

The first generation of advocates starting their practices in Indonesia in 1920 was a new professional group which had strong commitment to nationalism and progressive change.[12] They had been actively fighting for an independent state along with its modern legal system and institutions. They, for instance, strongly recommended Indonesia to adopt the Raad van Justitie judicial system used by the colonial government to solve legal disputes among Europeans and foreign oriental people (Timur Asing) during the colonial period.[13] The main reason was the adherence of the respective judicial system towards principles of equality, certainty, and predictability of the law, which was totally in contrast with the Landraad judicial system as applied discriminatively by colonial government to solve legal disputes among indigenous people (pribumi).[14] Landraad for pribumi was intentionally developed by the colonial government to be a more “patrimonial” rather than “legal” judicial system, as part of their politics of dualism.[15] Landraad created more social and political stratum among indigenous people than equality before the law and took sides to state’s interest rather than to the interest of the people.[16]

Another reason behind the preference of the new group of Indonesian professionals towards the judicial system previously applied for Europeans was that such a system better respected the existence and functions of advocates, in which legal representation by professional advocates was required in most of legal disputes heard and decided by the courts.[17] This was contrary to the pribumi judicial system, in which anyone could either formally or informally provide legal representation, as long as the judge and the indigenous litigating parties agreed.[18] Generally in the Landraad system, the courts did not deem legal representation by professional advocates necessary.[19]

The aspiration of Indonesian advocates to have a modern judicial system was portrayed by a sharp debate between Mohammad Yamin, an advocate of Sumatran descent, and Raden Soepomo, a Javanese aristocrat who served both as bureaucrat and law professor, on July 1945, particularly at the time when the first Constitution was being drafted.[20] Yamin proposed a new constitution that recognized a broad spectrum of citizens’ rights, a constitution that granted the Supreme Court with the authority of judicial review and clearly separated the legislative, executive, and judicial functions.[21] The major premises used by Yamin were: (i) the clear distinction between state and citizens; (ii) recognition towards individual rights; and (iii) the needs of institutional control towards political power.[22] At the statutory level, according to Yamin, adopting the Raad van Justitie judicial system could best represent those premises. On the other hand, Soepomo ascertained that Indonesian legal professionals did not have sufficient experience to employ any systems different from the Landraad judicial system.[23] The Landraad, according to Soepomo, was more familiar to Indonesian jurists and people due to its adapted features to Indonesian situations made by the colonial government.[24]

The political constellation at the early stage of the independence benefited Soepomo’s argument.[25] The pragmatic consideration used by the government made it choose to maintain the use of the Landraad system along with its procedural law regime, Herziene Indonesisch Reglement, rather than adopting the Raad van Justitie. This choice of course disappointed many professional advocates.[26]

However, a dramatic political change occurred, which brought about strong positive influence towards the legal process after the revolution. When the presidential 1945 Constitution was factually replaced by a parliamentary system of government as introduced by the 1950 Constitution, Indonesian advocates accordingly started to take part more actively in politics.[27] Most of them were heavily involved in the works of government which caused the legal profession to be rather left behind.[28] During the parliamentary era, until the late of 1950s a number of advocates served in government; Sartono served as chairman of the parliament, Iskaq Tjokrohadisuryo became Finance Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo had been serving twice as Prime Minister, Besar Mertokoesoemo became the Secretary of the Department of Justice, and Sunarjo became Foreign Minister.[29] Two other Ministers, Lukman Wiriadinata (PSI) and Jodi Gondokusumo (Nationalist People Party) were also advocates.[30]

Not many studies were conducted regarding this period of Indonesian history, while it actually deserves to get more attention, at least to balance the intentionally generated myth by the government of how terrible the period was.[31] In fact, the years of the parliamentary system were very difficult considering that it was the initial phase of the independence following the revolution.[32] Nevertheless, the parliamentary government could substantially debate and enact a lot of legislations.[33] They could also finally unify and broaden the functioning of the judicial system throughout the country.[34] During this period as well, the first democratic election in Indonesia was held.[35]

To add to those accomplishments, corruption can be said to be rarely found in the parliamentary era.[36] Compared to the Guided Democracy and New Order Era, at the least, corrupt practices within 1950’s became a controlled subject by, among other things, the legal process.[37] Despite of many fundamental weaknesses—such as lack of financial capacity, trained human resources, equipment, and lack of other basic facilities—the legal system inherited from the Dutch colonial era worked very well and impressive under the parliamentary government.[38]

The decisions made by courts during the parliamentary era also show that judges from district court level up to the Supreme Court were not only leading the litigation process, but also —to the best of their effort in such a very difficult situation— started to adjust the old statutory provisions with the new condition.[39] The same thing happened with the Public Prosecution Services and the Police, which were equipped with capable and law oriented leadership.[40] During the parliamentary system of government, the courts, public prosecution services, and the police were not halfhearted in enforcing the law, even against top rank political figures.[41] In short, the legal system at that time was highly respected by people who dealt with the judiciary.[42] Of course there were several protests towards the failure of the government to replace colonial laws with the new ones, and the slow prosecution and adjudication process, however, in general, the legal institutions were highly respected and trusted.[43]

So why did the legal system work that well in that period? The fundamental answer does not depend on the quality of legal institutions, but merely on the autonomy and self-confidence of the legal system, which came from the political system and its underlying principles.[44] The other fundamental answer is that the generation of national leaders at that time comprised of highly educated people, mostly with a legal education background, and ideologically aware of the importance of democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of law concept.[45]

Because the balance between the state and citizens was highly upheld, various labor unions, civil society organizations, political parties, and professional associations were supporting the limitation of public authorities that was very much apprehended by the leaders of parliamentary government.[46] Those circumstances also had its impact towards legal institutions, which although formed by the state, were very sensitive to the pressures from outside.[47]

Right before the end of 1950s, the parliamentary government system was dissolved under the force of the military and President Soekarno.[48] The 1945 Constitution was declared to be re-implemented. The regime was replaced with the Guided Democracy regime, which unfortunately abolished every effort and achievement that was pioneered by advocates, such as liberal constitutionalism, effective and autonomous legal process, etc. Advocates became those who suffered the most, in terms of professional, political, and ideological losses.[49] Up until the 1960s, when the Indonesian Advocates Association (Peradin) was established, there had been no significant development to be noted from the role of advocates within the government system, besides their role to put pressures from outside on judicial independence and civil rights.

Grounds for Advocates’ Public Role

Thus, with the many good experiences in the parliamentary system era discussed above, demonstrating the positive impact of advocates’ involvement in the government and other public offices and roles, how should the current dual office holding issue of the advocates be approached? There are some arguments that can be advanced to explain and legitimize the tendency of advocates to shift from their professional world to get involved in public roles. The first argument explains that the tendency does represent the unfinished struggle of advocates to achieve the rule of law and democratic nation. As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, lawyers are the most powerful existing security against the excesses of democracy, supplying the sobriety and stability, which every good society requires.[50]

The second argument asserts that advocates are considered as the right people to run the country since they are fully trained to fulfill such a role.[51] Many good reasons can be identified to defend why lawyers should run public offices because of their training. One of the reasons says that, “Lawyers are trained to pay close attention to detail and this likely reduces the number of mistakes in legislative drafting.[52] Lawyers work with laws on a more intensive basis than any other segment of society and can benefit the public with the expertise they bring from everyday experience.”[53] Other opinion states that, “Lawyers are trained in such legal skills as negotiation, mediation and advocacy and the art of compromise.[54] Lawyers are trained to listen to both sides and this is perfect training for service in the legislature.”[55]

Furthermore, advocates historically maintained excellent track records in administering the government.[56] Besides the above-presented facts of Indonesian history, illustrating the added value that lawyers can bring to the quality of state and nation building, other countries such as the United States also have their own historical evidence of the significant role of lawyers as the primary social architects of the nation.[57] Twenty-five out of the 56 signatories of the Declaration of Independence were lawyers, and 35 of the 55 delegates to the Constitutional Convention were lawyers, or at least had legal training.[58]

Additionally, lawyers have historically taken a very active role in the US executive branch of government. Thirteen out of the first 16 American Presidents were lawyers, and out of 44 Presidents who have served since the country was founded, 28 of them are lawyers.[59] Lawyers have also served with distinction in the legislative branch of government where one-third of the members of the first US House of Representatives were lawyers.[60] These are not to mention obvious lawyers’ vested interest in the judicial branch of government.

However, each of the aforementioned arguments has their own counter. The first argument which emphasizes the motivation to fight for the rule of law can be challenged by the bias, which would likely occur when an advocate enters the public sphere, namely misuse of public office to foster his/her professional practice. The art of politics can be very dominant in this circumstance. The initial noble motivation can transform into the misuse of public means in order to preserve privileges of their private life. Subsequently, contrasting it with the representative democracy system introduced by the constitution can rebut the second argument, which pinpoints technical and intellectual capacity. The introduction of the representative democracy system means that the constitution desires democracy to be an open door for any components of the nation, any professions, and any expertise, to take part in the administration of the state, and not to be monopolized by lawyers. Every component of the nation is responsible for making decisions in the realm of public policy that serve for the best of the collective interest. Moreover, both technical and intellectual capacity mastered by the lawyers can be substituted with advise, consultation, and recommendation functions provided by professional experts. The policy makers themselves should not necessarily possess such capacity.

Finally, the third argument which concerned historical practices can be questioned by comparing it to the current professional orientation and integrity, which have dramatically changed from the values upheld by the first generation of advocates at the initial phase following independence. During that period, the legal profession was regarded as an honorable profession, attracting proclivity of people with firm integrity and high esteem towards principles of justice, not people who are merely driven by private and personal achievements, mainly economic achievements, as is demonstrated by some advocates nowadays.

But the above-mentioned counter-arguments are not sufficient, in my opinion, to completely close the door for advocates to enter into public roles and hold certain public offices. Because it is not inconceivable that among those who have entered into public offices are a few advocates (or many, hopefully) who actually have a strong motivation to substantiate good government under the rule of law from within, as a continuance of their (previous) struggle to achieve that aspiration from the outside. No one can deny that the intellectual capacity possessed by advocates could be very useful to undertake certain specific state’s tasks. Many advocates holding public offices can still preserve or even increase their professional orientation to serve for the best of public interest and protect their integrity. In this case, many of those types of officials are coming from advocates who developed their career in the field of public interest lawyering.[61]

Dual Office Holding

Substantively, the long debates and arguments on the dual office issue should have been resolved by now. Almost every law regulating a specific public office contains a prohibition of dual office holding in its provisions. As one example, Law No. 17 of 2014 on the Structure and the Status of the Parliament contains prohibition of dual office holding, which is scattered in many articles of the Law.

Law No. 17 of 2014 for instance, regulates the prohibition of dual office holding of members of parliament. Article 236(2) of the Law provides that “any members of the House of Representatives are not allowed to serve in private education institution nor perform any profession or occupations such as public accountant, consultant, advocate, notaries, and other occupations/profession, which has a certain relation to their tasks, authorities, and privileges as members of House of Representatives.”[62]

However, Law No. 30 of 2002 on Corruption Eradication Commission does not only firmly prohibit but also introduces the criminalization of dual office holding. Article 65 of the Law provides that, “every commissioner of the Corruption Eradication Commission who violates the provision as stipulated in Article 36 can be sentenced with a maximum of 5 years detainment.”[63] Article 36 in turn, primarily in point c, prohibits a commissioner of the Corruption Eradication Commission to, “occupy an office of commissioner or director of a company, board member of a foundation, supervisor or director of cooperation, and other professions or activities which has a certain relation to his/her office.”[64]

Of course the degree of firmness of such provisions varies from one to another. This happens because the adaptation of the prohibition by the lawmakers to the characteristics and the scope of each of the distinct offices. Actually the approach to address the dual office issue in each law regulating public office based on the characteristics and scope of responsibility of concerned office is in all conscience correct. By doing so, there will be no wipe out method which could block access of certain groups of society —who by coincidence are holding or performing a certain occupation or profession— to undertake public duties.

Characteristics of a public office can be looked at for instance from its recruitment system (either political or career based recruitment), its term of office (continually or temporarily), the demand of its official’s performance (full time or part time), etc. While the scope of responsibility of a public office can be measured by indicating the potential conflict of interest between rights, obligations, and authorities attached to such an office and other offices, profession, or occupation.

In comparison, in the United States, although attorneys have historically provided leadership in the legislative, executive, and judicial branch of government,[65] the way attorneys see the office in the legislative branch is different from other branches. No other branch presents lawyers with a variety of opportunities for conflict of interest as the legislative.[66] Due to its characteristics and scope in the US context, the legislative office has not traditionally been considered as a full-time office but rather as served only part time. Moreover, political pressure generally kept state legislative salaries at relatively low levels.[67] Therefore, maintaining another occupation has been seen as an economic necessity[68] for legislators especially on a state level,[69] which would be impossible for other offices.

Even to a similar office in the same branch yet on a different level, the approach would be different. After much criticism and a Bar recommendation that all outside practice be prohibited, the US Congress on federal level[70] made it virtually impossible for representatives and senators to engage in outside practice.[71] In any event, service in Congress on federal level and campaigning for reelection has become a full time job.[72] Members of Congress who are lawyers simply cannot afford to spend time in private practice.[73]

Conflict of Interest

From the above discussion, one can conclude that the core problem of the dual office issue is its inherent potential conflict of interest. The conflict of interest itself can be defined as “a situation where someone, such as a public official, employee, or professional, has certain private or personal interests, which might influence the objective performance of his/her official duties.” There are three key elements in the definition of a conflict of interest. The first element is the existence of a private/personal interest, which frequently appears to be a financial interest or other form of interest. When an attorney enters the legislature and maintains a law practice, not only his personal interest but also clients’ interests will come along as extra baggage.[74] Thus the potential conflict of interest is multiplied.[75]

The problem will come forth when the personal interest and client’s interest are encroached with the second element of the definition, “official duty”, a duty which is performed due to certain office and due to action in a formal capacity. In the case of lawyer-legislator, a legislator’s primary responsibility is to advocate his/her constituents’ interests.[76] Conducting certain activities in private practice can suggest to a legislator’s constituents that he/she is using public office to advance his/her personal interests rather than theirs.[77]

The third element of the definition is that the conflict of interest will influence the responsibility of professionals or public officials in many ways. Professionals and public officials are expected to do their function objectively and independently. Clients and public in general will normally have certain concerns with regard to the objectivity and independence of both professionals and public officials if they apparently are in the middle of situations which might lead them into a conflict of interest. Conflict of interest can lure professionals and public officials to commit unethical (which in turn could be illegal) actions as follow:[78]

1. Using their public office to secure contracts made for their professional practice;
2. Receiving benefits. Bribery is one example and gratification is another;
3. Trading in influence by attempting to gain personal benefit as a barter of the use of his/her influence in public office to unfairly prioritize the interest of certain parties;
4. Misusing public facilities for private purposes;
5. Misusing confidential information, either information obtained from their clients to be used in the name of their public office, or vice versa.

Therefore, it can be understood why Indonesian advocates through some major bar associations gained significant support from not only NGOs and legal scholars, but also from the public in general, in their effort to push the parliament prohibiting the dual office holding in the Advocate law. Regardless of the motivation behind their movement to voice such concern, the wider legal community and the public in expressing their support saw that even a potential conflict of interest could develop into the actual one. This by chance cooperation among leadership of Indonesian bar associations, NGOs, legal scholars, and prominent figures in the public, could effectively block the attempt to keep allowing legislators who —in Indonesian case— are serving full time, receiving a relatively high salary and substantial benefits from the state, and having rather dominant influence and power, to maintain their private practice as lawyers.

Conclusion

The final stance towards the dual office holding issue in the deliberation of the Indonesian Advocate law was to ban it completely. Article 20(3) of the Law No. 18 of 2003 on Advocate provides that, “An advocate holding public office is not allowed to perform his/her profession during the term of respective office.”[79] Based on that article, lawyers who are appointed or elected as public officials will be automatically suspended by the Bar Association. Since the Bar Association was the appointing authority according to the Article 2(2) of the Advocate Law, “The appointment of advocate is conducted by the bar Association,”[80] it will consequently act as the suspending authority.

The suspension itself is an administrative mechanism. It is different from the suspension as the result of ethics enforcement measures which have been introduced by Article 7(1) of the Advocate Law. Considering its administrative nature, the suspension mechanism to operationalize the Article 20(3) will not involve any disciplinary procedures or institutions. When an advocate is officially appointed to hold certain public office, the Bar Association will then mechanically issue an administrative decision to freeze the practice license of the respective advocate for certain period.

The suspension period can comprise of the service term of the public office held and additional 1 or 2 years of cooling-off period. The objective of including the cooling-off period is to neutralize any remaining privileges, which might still have influence after the service. That way, the former public official-lawyer will not be able to abuse their remaining privileges after service in representing clients in their professional practice.

Albeit the fact that the Article 20(3) totally prohibits the dual office holding, the Advocate Law still contains a norm which soften the consequence of such prohibition. The elucidation (Penjelasan) of the Article 20(3) provides that “the provision of this article is not intended to lessen the private rights and relations between the advocate and his/her law firm/office.”[81] This elucidation can be interpreted that being public official does not eliminate totally the relation between the advocate and his/her office.

Some observers negatively view that the norm created by the elucidation is evidence that members of the Law Committee of the parliament were halfhearted in prohibiting the dual office holding in the Advocate Law. However, from a different perspective, the elucidation can also be seen as a considerable endeavor to get rid of disincentives for advocates who have long been developing their professional practice to take role in public sphere.

The authorization to preserve private relations between advocates serving as public officials with their law firm/office does not necessarily become a legitimacy for them to keep performing any activities, or taking part in any forms, related to legal representations conducted by their office. If there is an indication that the lawyer-public official violates this proscription, then such violation could be brought before the ethics enforcement procedures by the Bar Association, which could end up with the permanent disbarment as stipulated in Article 16 of the Indonesian Advocates Code of Ethics and Article 7 of the Advocate Law.

The provision would be more ideal if it is accompanied by the application of the wealth reporting mechanism, which has been introduced by the Law No. 28 of 1999 on Good Government and the Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission. Article 5 of the Law No. 28 of 1999 provides that all public officials have the obligation to publicly report their assets prior to and after their service.[82] Public officials also have the obligation to allow audit and monitoring conducted towards their assets at any time during their term of office by Corruption Eradication Commission.[83]

Of course such Laws are not operational enough to achieve the aim of the prohibition of dual office holding in preventing the occurrence of conflict of interest among lawyers-legislators. Those must be accompanied by an effective code of ethics for advocates and other internal rules enacted and enforced by the Bar Association. However, the Bar Association will not be strong enough to execute its functions effectively if the Bar is not run democratically. The inbuilt democracy and participation in the management of the Bar Association, including in the formulation of the code of ethics and other internal rules, will build strong commitment among advocate members —both individually and collectively— to enforce the agreed upon rules and code of ethics. If the professional rules have been internalized within every advocate in Indonesia, probably someday Indonesian advocates can alter the joke quoted at the beginning of this article into: “Having lawyers create laws is like having doctors create medicines.”

[1]           See Article 3(i) of Indonesian Advocates Code of Ethics, signed and promulgated by 7 different Bar Associations on May 23, 2003. The previous version of the Code of Ethics promulgated before the enactment of Advocate Law contained the similar provision.

[2]           Hukumonline, November 3, 2000.

[3]           E. Karel Dewanto, RUU Advokat pun Terganjal Profesi…, Koran Tempo, June 3, 2002. See also, AWi/Nay/Apr, Advokat yang Jadi Pejabat Negara Memicu Conflict of Interest, Hukumonline, November 27, 2001.

[4]           Tra, Berlebihan, Larangan Anggota DPR Jadi Pengacara, Kompas, February 3, 2000.

[5]           Daniel S. Lev, Foreword to Binziad Kadafi, et.al., Advokat Indonesia Mencari Legitimasi: Studi tentang Tanggung Jawab Profesi Hukum di Indonesia. Jakarta: Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia, 2002: ix-xvi.

[6]           Id.

[7]           Id.

[8]           Id.

[9]           Id.

[10]          Id.

[11]          Id.

[12]          Daniel S. Lev, A Tale of Two Legal Professions, Lawyers and State in Malaysia and Indonesia, in the Raising the Bar: The Emerging Legal Profession in East Asia. In William P. Alford, ed. Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 2007: 383-414.

[13]          Id.

[14]          Id.

[15]          Id.

[16]          Id.

[17]          See Kadafi, supra, at 41-42.

[18]          Id.

[19]          Id.

[20]          Lev, A Tale…, supra.

[21]          Id.

[22]          Id.

[23]          Id.

[24]          Id.

[25]          Id.

[26]          Id.

[27]          Daniel S. Lev, Hukum dan Politik di Indonesia, Kesinambungan dan Perubahan. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990.

[28]          Id.

[29]          Id.

[30]          Some of them, Iskaq, Lukman, dan Jodi, returned back to practice after completing their service term. Id.

[31]          Lev, Law and State in Indonesia, Jentera Law Journal 8^th edition Year III (March 2005): 63-102, at 65.

[32]          In addition, Regional rebellions occurred in many provinces, only limited resources were available, the tension of the world’s cold war was just started, and horizontal conflicts happened in many places. See Id.

[33]          Id.

[34]          Id.

[35]          Id.

[36]          Id.

[37]          Id., at 66.

[38]          Id.

[39]          Id.

[40]          Id.

[41]          Id.

[42]          Id.

[43]          Id.

[44]          Id.

[45]          Id.

[46]          Id., at 67.

[47]          Id., at 68.

[48]          Id., at 69.

[49]          Id.

[50]          Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 123 (Richard D. Heffner ed., Penguin Books 1956), as quoted in Tracy W. Cary, Where Have All the Lawyers Gone?, 67 Ala. Law. 111, 114 (2006).

[51]          See Ronald Bibace, The State of the Union under a Failed Constitution, Rebuttal to the Legal Profession’s Arguments Against Exclusion from Elective Office in the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government, Part 1, The Federalist #87 (1995), at http://www.constitutionalguardian.com/federalist_papers/fed87.htm.

[52]          Cary, supra, at 115.

[53]          Id.

[54]          Id.

[55]          Id.

[56]          Bibace, supra.

[57]          Cary, supra, at 112.

[58]          Id.

[59]          See also John C. McCollister, God and the Oval Office (2005), as cited in Id. at 112. This includes the 44^th President of the United States, Barack Obama.

[60]          Id.

[61]          One of the most encouraging examples was the role of two Supreme Court justices, Artidjo Alkostar and Abdul Rahman Saleh (who then became Attorney General). These two justices were among the first justices in Indonesian legal history issuing dissenting opinion in two different cases. It was not coincidence that both justices came from the advocate profession and had been developing their prior career in legal aid institutes.

[62]          Law on the Structure and the Status of Indonesian Parliament, Law No. 17 of 2014.

[63]          Law on Corruption Eradication Commission, Law No. 30 of 2002.

[64]          Id.

[65]          Dennis Mitchell Henry, Lawyer-Legislator Conflict of Interest, 17 J. Legal Prof. 261 (1992).

[66]          Id.

[67]          George F. Carpinello, Should Practicing Lawyers Be Legislators, 41 Hastings L.J. 87, 99-100 (1989).

[68]          Henry, supra. Maintaining another occupation for legislators is not considered as hazardous in the US, as long as certain conditions, such as not to represent the interest of their clients before any government agencies, have been met.

[69]          Carpinello, supra, at 100.

[70]          Id., at 99.

[71]          Id.

[72]          Id.

[73]          Id.

[74]          Henry, supra, at 264.

[75]          Id.

[76]          Robert Reeves, Legislators as Private Attorneys: The Need for Legislative Reform, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1052 (1983).

[77]          Id.

[78]          Sheldon S. Steinberg & David T. Austern, Government, Ethics, and Managers, Penyelewengan Aparat Pemerintahan. Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosda Karya, 1999.

[79]          Law on Advocate, Law No. 18 of 2003.

[80]          Id.

[81]          Id.

[82]          Law on Good Government, Law No. 28 of 1999.

[83]          Id. See also Article 13(a) of the Law on the Corruption Eradication Commission, Law No. 30 of 2002.

*This article was published in Jurnal Hukum & Pasar Modal, Volume VII/11th Edition, January-June 2016

Download pdf here 2016-01-01 Binziad Kadafi “Dual Office Holding and the Role of Lawyer in Public Policy”

Revitalizing Indonesian civil justice*

by Binziad Kadafi**

There are two recent considerations that can be tied to the establishment of a mechanism for the settlement of small claims (small claims court) in Indonesia.

The first consideration is the constantly low number of civil claims and the second is Indonesia’€™s status in a recent universal assessment of the condition of civil justice.

Those two considerations have added to a long aspiration to expand access to justice as

advocated by various elements of civil society, including the specific aims of a limitation of cassation of small cases to reduce the case backlog that has long been voiced by the judiciary and business climate improvement that has lately become part of the agenda of the government.

The number of civil claims is important to be aware of as it is commonly used to indicate the level of public confidence in the courts.

In civil claims, people voluntarily bring their legal issues to the court for intervention through a competent decision.

This has to be distinguished from civil petition, which does not arise out of a dispute and is merely a form of civic compliance in civil administration. It must also be distinguished from criminal cases, where people are forcibly brought to the court by law enforcers.

In 2015, there were only 28,374 civil claims that went to first instance courts of general jurisdiction (district courts) throughout Indonesia. That figure is often mixed with the number of petitions, which if combined together may appear to make the courts’€™ civil case roll large, with 59,890 cases.

Moreover, if the figures are complemented by another 4 million incoming criminal cases (though 95 percent of them are summary traffic violations), they may amount to 4.55 million cases.

The number of the civil claims is however very low in comparison to almost 60 million micro, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which is the group with the most potential to bring them to court.

It becomes even smaller, if compared with the total population of Indonesia, which now exceeds 255 million. This small number of civil claims was handled by 14,847 court personnel in 353 district courts in 2015, including 3,311 judges.

One may notice that the 28,374 civil claims were an increase of 7.35 percent from the figure in 2014, and an increase of 60.8 percent compared with 2013.

The larger number may be welcomed as a mark of rising confidence in Indonesian civil courts. However, given its ratio to SMEs and compared to the size of Indonesia’€™s population it is still not commendable.

The question is why the number of civil claims in Indonesia is so small. It could be caused by shared public perceptions that civil justice in Indonesia is expensive, long and convoluted.

Not to mention the doubts about the integrity of the process. Due to the reluctance to go to court, people will let their disputes fade away without proper settlement.

Some simply consider the problems as a business risk, bad luck, or an ordeal from God.

Many also choose to criminalize a civil dispute by categorizing it as fraud, embezzlement or defamation. Not a few find their own way out by means outside the law.

In turn, such perceptions and attitudes can discourage people from starting, maintaining, let alone expanding their business. In the end, the reluctance to go to court contributes to the wheels of the economy becoming slowed.

Some of the above perceptions of civil justice in Indonesia are confirmed by a recent survey on the ease of doing business (EoDB) by the World Bank.

The annual survey by the World Bank was last carried out in 2015 in 189 countries, of which Indonesia was ranked 109th.

The EoDB survey used multiple assessments, among other factors, ease of starting a business, obtaining credit, getting electricity, paying tax and enforcing contracts, which is more accurately read as the settlement of civil disputes.

Let us focus on the assessment of enforcing contracts where its components fall under the scope of court authority. Whereas Indonesia’€™s ranking in the overall EoDB survey was 109th, its ranking in the enforcement of contracts was much lower, at 170 of 189 countries.

According to the World Bank, settlement of civil disputes took 460 days in Jakarta and 510 days in Surabaya from the filing of a claim to the enforcement of judgment.

The cost ratio was 118 percent in Jakarta and 107.3 percent in Surabaya, with the largest component of the cost being a lawyer. This means that, in these two cities, the cost of processing a civil claim is actually higher than its value, where most of the costs goes to lawyers.

The quality index of judicial processes in Jakarta was said to be 6.5 out of 18, while Surabaya was 5.5. The lowest score in the index could be found in the court automation element, since only online publication of decisions has been established in Indonesia, not electronic registration or electronic payment of court fees.

On Aug. 7, 2015 the Supreme Court issued Regulation (Perma) No. 2/2015 on a mechanism of settlement of small claims, which tries to solve some of the basic problems of civil justice.

A small claim is defined as a case of breach of contract or a tort outside land disputes, with a claim under the value of Rp 200 million (US$14,500), where standard of proof is simple, and according to the laws should not be resolved through special courts.

Small claims are examined and decided by a single judge, and only at the level of objection the claim will be heard by a panel of judges in the same district court, where the decision is final and cannot be brought to appeal or cassation.

The case settlement period is made short, which requires only 58-60 days from the initial filing of the claim to the stage where final decision can be secured.

This shortened period is facilitated by the provision where parties must be domiciled in the jurisdiction of the same district court so that summonsing can be made simpler, but also by a summarized hearing process, accommodating informal verbal questions and answers.

Judges play an active role in a trial that must be attended directly by the parties, so that the need for legal counsel can be reduced. Not only is it speedier, but those innovations are also expected to provide more affordable civil proceedings.

This mechanism is still new. Several district courts are only making preparations to implement it. The community does not widely know about its existence yet.

Of the few cases that have come in (21 in 2015), some were resolved with only four court sessions, less than 25 days and ending in mediation. In other cases, the plaintiff won the claim that was decided in less than 25 days by a single judge.

Dissemination to the public needs to be carried out so that this new mechanism can become widely known and utilized as one of the protectors of economic activities.

Hopefully, the number of claims to district courts will continue to rise, which can signal improved convenience for Indonesians in starting up their businesses including resolving any disputes that may arise from their business activities.

*Published in the paper edition of The Jakarta Post, 29 March 2016. The article can also be accessed through http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/29/revitalizing-indonesian-civil-justice.html
**The writer is a senior advisor at the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) and PhD candidate at Tilburg Law School, the Netherlands. This is a personal view.

Download pdf here 2016-03-29 Binziad Kadafi “Revitalizing Indonesian Civil Justice”

Perdebatan Doktriner Mengenai Peninjauan Kembali*

Oleh Binziad Kadafi**

Finalitas proses dan putusan pengadilan

Prinsip finalitas terefleksikan dengan baik oleh maksim litis finiri oportet. Bahwa proses yudisial harus mencapai titik akhir, dan putusan pengadilan harus dilindungi untuk tidak diuji kembali oleh lembaga peradilan yang sama atau lembaga peradilan lain.

Keinginan agar putusan pengadilan menuntaskan sengketa hukum dikenal di berbagai sistem hukum kontemporer. Teori mengenai finalitas proses dan putusan peradilan diletakkan di atas dua dasar, yaitu pertama, kebijakan publik, dan kedua, keadilan individual.

Di sisi kebijakan publik, pemerintah memiliki kepentingan kuat terhadap finalitas. Prinsip negara hukum menuntut bahwa ketika negara telah memulai suatu proses peradilan, maka ia akan menghormati keluarannya (Klip

& Van Der Wilt, 2002). Jika putusan pengadilan tidak dihormati dan dianggap final, legitimasi negara akan jatuh.

Sementara di sisi keadilan individual, seseorang tidak dapat didakwa kembali atas perbuatan yang sama ketika sudah dinyatakan bersalah atau dibebaskan. Begitu pun seseorang tidak boleh digugat kembali atas sengketa perdata yang telah diputus pengadilan dengan putusan final (Jacob, 1970).

Ada beberapa doktrin mengenai finalitas yang berkembang, baik di wilayah hukum perdata maupun pidana. Doktrin yang paling mengemuka adalah res judicata, yang dikenal sebagai doktrin hukum perdata. Doktrin lain adalah ne bis in idem, sebuah konsep dalam hukum pidana yang sebanding dengan doktrin double jeopardy di negara common law.

Tujuan dari doktrin res judicata adalah melindungi finalitas putusan pengadilan dan menghindarkan sumber daya peradilan terbuang sia-sia dengan mencegah litigasi ulang atas tuntutan dan isu hukum, yang seharusnya sudah ditetapkan dalam sebuah putusan (Plumer, 1986). Res judicata juga melindungi keadilan individual seorang tergugat dari peluang dilecehkan secara hukum (Moschzisker, 1929).

Adapun esensi dari doktrin ne bis in idem adalah larangan dakwaan ulang terhadap suatu putusan bersalah atau putusan bebas di perkara pidana. Bahkan di negara yang lemah perlindungannya terhadap hak-hak individu sekalipun, aturan yang melarang pemerintah mendakwa ulang seseorang yang telah diputus bebas sangat dijamin (Levmore & Porat, 2011). Tanpa doktrin ne bis in idem, pemerintah dapat melakukan tuntutan berkali-kali terhadap warganya hingga memenangkan perkara.

Falibilitas proses dan putusan pengadilan

Namun terlepas dari pentingnya finalitas, putusan yang dibuat manusia dinilai pasti mengandung kelemahan, bisa jadi salah atau ada dalam situasi falibilitas. Salah satu aspek dari falibilitas putusan manusia adalah bahwa kita kadang hanya mampu mengambil sebagian dari informasi yang relevan dengan putusan, dari data mentah yang tersedia secara terbatas. Aspek lain adalah “bias” yang kita miliki yang kadang tidak tampak oleh mata kita sendiri bahkan orang lain (Sah, 1991).

Tidak ada institusi bentukan manusia yang bebas dari kesalahan. Lembaga yang berwenang menyelenggarakan peradilan pun dapat melanggar hukum (Abbot, 1916). Bahkan di peradilan tertinggi kekeliruan bisa terjadi, meski putusannya sering secara ambigu dianggap kedap kesalahan dan dekat dengan kesempurnaan.

Penjelasan atas ambiguitas itu bukan pada atribut para hakim tertinggi sebagai otak hukum terbaik (perfect legal minds), tetapi lebih karena perkara di level peradilan tertinggi telah menyerap waktu litigasi yang substansial (Craighead, 2003). Untuk menerima fakta bahwa bahkan hakim di pengadilan tertinggi pun bisa menyalahi hukum tidak berarti mempertanyakan kehormatan, kepandaian, atau efisiensi mereka, namun mengakui fakta yang sulit diperdebatkan bahwa berbuat salah itu manusiawi (Abbot, 1916).

Peninjauan Kembali

Karena itu sangat melegakan untuk tahu bahwa masa di mana hakim punya diskresi penuh dalam mengeluarkan putusan yang tidak bisa diganggu gugat telah berlalu. Untuk menjamin akurasi putusan, pengadilan banding dibentuk, sehingga tidak ada lagi hakim atau pengadilan yang bekerja sendiri dan tidak dikontrol (Bator, 1963). Sebab terlepas dari sikap hati-hati yang dipenuhi hakim, kekeliruan atau kesalahan tetap dapat terjadi, dan kesempatan untuk mengajukan keberatan atas kesalahan tersebut harus tetap dibuka.

Secara prinsip, sebenarnya putusan sudah dapat diterima secara sosial dengan terpenuhinya upaya hukum biasa atau terlampauinya waktu untuk mengajukannya. Namun pembentuk hukum akan merasa perlu memastikan bahwa putusan yang telah final sekalipun masih bisa dikoreksi dengan persyaratan yang ketat dan hanya untuk alasan luar biasa. Untuk itulah upaya hukum luar biasa, dalam hal ini peninjauan kembali (PK), diatur.

Terdapat beberapa argumen yang membela keberadaan mekanisme PK, untuk mengakomodasi kekuatiran akan falibilitas proses dan putusan peradilan. Argumen pertama, sebagaimana disebut di atas, adalah memperbaiki kesalahan guna melindungi pencari keadilan dari terampasnya harta benda (perdata) serta nyawa dan kemerdekaan (pidana) secara salah (Robertson, 2012).

Argumen kedua adalah memulihkan kepercayaan publik pada pengadilan yang hanya bisa dicapai ketika setiap potensi peradilan sesat bisa ditinjau kembali. Terlalu besar biaya sosial yang harus ditanggung ketika muncul protes lantaran ada peradilan sesat yang tidak diluruskan (Malleson, 1994).

Argumen ketiga, pemeriksaan ulang atas suatu perkara bertahun-tahun setelah putusannya berkekuatan hukum tetap, dapat meningkatkan akurasi. Dengan peninjauan kembali, pengadilan tidak hanya melihat fakta yang melingkupi suatu perkara secara retrospektif, namun juga informasi terkini dari suatu perkara secara prospektif (Scott, 2014). Adapun argumen terakhir adalah kepentingan pengadilan secara kelembagaan untuk menjaga konsistensi penerapan hukum yang dapat dilakukan melalui PK (Malleson, 1994).

Dari sudut pandang finalitas, terdapat pula argumen yang menentang keberadaan PK. Argumen pertama, PK dianggap mahal dan tidak efisien (Berman, 2014). Pemeriksaan perkara melibatkan investasi uang dan waktu yang harus ditanggung sebagian atau seluruhnya oleh publik (Scott, 2014). Pengadilan pun tidak dapat berlama-lama dengan suatu perkara, sebab perkara lain sudah berbaris dalam antrian dan penyelesaiannya akan tertunda (Van Dijk, 2014).

Argumen kedua, karena PK biasanya dilakukan lama setelah suatu putusan dianggap final, prosesnya akan membuahkan hasil yang kurang akurat. PK, karena faktor waktu, juga tidak bisa lagi dipandang sebagai pelindung kepentingan pencari keadilan dengan beberapa alasan. Pertama, putusannya sering datang terlambat untuk menolong pencari keadilan, dan kedua, biasanya dia tidak dapat menunda eksekusi putusan final (Rossman, 1990).

Argumen terakhir, PK dianggap dapat mengancam reputasi sistem peradilan. Sering muncul kecurigaan, bahwa PK (apalagi oleh Jaksa) bisa disalahgunakan pemerintah untuk membatasi kemerdekaan mereka yang telah diputus bebas di suatu perkara pidana (Rossman, 1990). John Marshall pernah menyatakan, tidak seorang pun, atau sistem hukum, atau masyarakat, yang bisa ambil manfaat dari litigasi ulang atas persoalan hukum yang sesungguhnya telah diselesaikan (Scott, 2014).

Konteks Indonesia

Pertanyaan menggelitik dari berbagai uraian di atas adalah, apakah kita di Indonesia telah melakukan perdebatan setara? Apakah kita sudah mengindahkan berbagai prinsip dan doktrin hukum yang ada, menimbang-nimbang antara finalitas dan falibilitas, serta antara kebijakan publik dan keadilan individual saat melembagakan PK dalam sistem hukum kita?

Sebagaimana kita tahu, pada awal 2014 Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) menerbitkan Putusan yang membatalkan ketentuan KUHAP yang membatasi PK hanya dapat diajukan satu kali. Untuk meresponnya, Mahkamah Agung (MA) kemudian mengeluarkan edaran yang pada intinya tidak mengindahkan Putusan MK tersebut. Reaksi lanjutan pun datang, yaitu dari pemerintah, dalam hal ini Kementerian Hukum dan HAM yang bertekad memperjelas situasi dengan menggodok draf peraturan pemerintah tentang PK. Ketiga dinamika paling akhir mengenai PK tersebut merupakan kelanjutan dari kontroversi panjang sebelumnya, antara lain tentang: PK terhadap putusan PK; PK oleh jaksa; hingga PK oleh terpidana yang buron.

Lalu muncul pertanyaan di level praktis. Apakah berbagai pertimbangan terhadap prinsip dan doktrin di atas juga mengemuka saat para pencari keadilan dan kuasa hukumnya, termasuk jaksa, mengajukan rata-rata 2,500 permohonan PK di semua perkara setiap tahun ke MA guna membela kepentingan hukum mereka?

*Sebelumnya dimuat di Hukumonline.com, 22 Maret 2016, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt56f0b268bc9b7/perdebatan-doktriner-mengenai-peninjauan-kembali-broleh–binziad-kadafi-

**PhD candidate pada Tilburg Law School, Belanda/Pengajar pada Sekolah Tinggi Hukum Indonesia Jentera

Download pdf di sini 2016-03-22 Binziad Kadafi “Perdebatan Doktriner Mengenai Peninjauan Kembali”

Important Elements of Public Confidence in the Courts: The Indonesian Case (a Preliminary Study)*

by Binziad Kadafi

The courts and the public trust

Discussion regarding the trust or distrust of the courts is not something new. Roscoe Pound raised the issue more than 100 years ago, in a famous speech he made before the American Bar Association meeting in 1906.[1] It could be said, hence, that the discussion of this problem might be as old as the law itself.[2]

The question is why is public confidence in the courts so important? Already discussed a century ago and we are still talking about it today? The best answer to this is the strong belief shared by many of us that the power of the courts lies mainly in public trust. That is why the judiciary is often referred to as “least dangerous” branch of government as it has neither the power of budget (“purse”) that the legislative branch has nor the coercive power (“sword”) held by the executive branch.[3] Ultimately judicial power rests on substantial public confidence in its moral sanction.[4]

The judiciary has only the trust and confidence of the public and the grounding of the rule of law to produce respect for its judgments and decrees.[5] The respect accorded to judges depends on the way they meet the expectations of fairness and justice, which individuals (public) have of them and on the substantive values which their decisions and procedures promote.[6]

Public trust is indeed considered important by the Indonesian courts. In a keynote speech at the closing of a national working meeting of the Indonesian Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia) in 2011, the then Chief Justice, Dr. Harifin Tumpa, for several times stressed on the importance of public confidence in the courts.[7] Harifin Tumpa appealed to hundreds of judges attending the meeting that good decisions must continue to be advanced, as they contribute to the growth of public confidence in the courts.[8] One of the ways of doing so, according to Harifin Tumpa, is by implementing the chamber system, which is expected to increase public confidence in the judiciary through increased consistency in the use of legal concepts.[9]

In his speech, Tumpa even went so far as to challenge whoever his successor would be, to have the passion and courage to keep on the independence of the judiciary, so as to regain the public trust that has long faded.[10] Through such a challenge, Tumpa deliberately raised the strong link between public confidence in the courts and the principle of independence (as well as accountability) of the judiciary as set out in Indonesian constitution and all legislation on judicial power. Such a linkage was also notably observed by E. Norman Veasey, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, United States, in his keynote address to a bench-bar conference held in 2000.[11] He asserted that the courts has only one constituent, namely the “rule of law”.[12] He also expressed the view that judicial independence is not the judge’s property, but the property of the people, an asset held in trust.[13] Likewise, judicial accountability is the right of the people.[14] The judges are, in Veasey’s view, the trustees of that trust and required to preserve and manage it well through proper action and appearances, not on occasion or when convenient, but all the time.[15]

In Indonesia, the issuance of the Joint Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chairman of the Judicial Commission (Komisi Yudisial) on Judicial Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct (Kode Etik & Pedoman Perilaku Hakim/KEPPH) in 2009, marked the increasingly institutionalized efforts to gain public trust. Achieving public confidence would no longer just be the agenda of the courts, but also belongs to its constitutional counterpart, the Judicial Commission, which subsequently forwarded the agenda to the judges through the implementation of standards of proper behavior.

The general provisions of the KEPPH provide that the internal and external supervision of judges performed by both the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission is oriented towards ensuring that all judges, being the primary executors of the judicial function, uphold high integrity, honesty and professionalism, so as to attain the trust of the public and justice seekers.[16] The provisions also mandate the importance of judges both inside and outside the courts to maintain and foster public confidence, as well as the confidence of the justice seekers.[17] Furthermore, in many of the articles of the KEPPH, the provisions on different attitudes of “impartiality”, “independence”, “honesty”, and “discipline” of judges are always associated with the necessity to reinforce public confidence and the confidence of justice seekers towards the judiciary.[18]

In addition to that, the current Indonesian Chief Justice, Dr. M. Hatta Ali delivered a strong argument in his address to the closing ceremony of the national working meeting of the Supreme Court in Manado in 2012.[19] The point he stressed was: “we are nothing without public confidence,” a statement that was headlined in Indonesian press reports.[20] On a different occasion, at the inauguration of twelve Heads of High Courts held at the Supreme Court on 27 December 2012, Hatta Ali said that public trust is something that is hard to get, but can diminish easily due to skepticism.[21] He asserted that years of struggle in building public confidence in the courts can be lost only in a moment, and therefore courts can no longer tolerate any improper behaviors that erode the reputation and the integrity of the judiciary.[22] The Chairman of the Judicial Commission, Dr. Suparman Marzuki, also raised the same concern on the occasion of the 9^th anniversary of the Judicial Commission by stressing that the most serious problem currently faced by the courts is the lack of public confidence.[23]

Symptoms of public confidence in the courts

Despite the strong commitment made by the leadership of the Supreme Court and other members of Indonesian judiciary through numerous judicial reform programs introduced and carried out from 2000 onwards, public opinion of the courts has not changed as much as might have been anticipated.[24] Public confidence in the courts has improved, but is not yet extensive. This assessment is articulated not only by outside stakeholders, but even by the leadership of the judiciary and the judges themselves.

More empirical and therefore objective information should be used and advanced to back up any observations on the level of public confidence in the court. Some symptoms that can help to measure the state of public confidence in the courts in Indonesia are as follow.

a. The number of incoming cases

The number of incoming cases might be the most powerful indicator of public confidence in the courts. It can display whether litigation is a trusted mechanism and hence relied upon to resolve problems and disputes that emerge in the daily life of Indonesian society, in every possible sphere, not only in civil cases, but also in administrative matters.

To get a picture of the extent of judicial involvement in state administrative matters, let us take a look at the administrative courts, the most important courts for Indonesian citizens to seek redress against the government.[25] The administrative courts consist of 28 courts of first instance and 4 appeal courts, with 300 judges and 860 support staff.[26] But, on average, this system delivers only 1,704 decisions every year.[27] This is the total number for the entire country; the total number of cases filed from among 250 million citizens. In fact, regrettably we can not claim that this number is so small because Indonesians have no complaints against the bureaucracy, or because everything works well in the area of state administration and public services.[28]

The performance of the labor courts is similar. There are 33 labor courts in Indonesia, but only 749 cases were filed in these courts in 2013.[29] This is another minuscule figure, and the figure cannot honestly be explained by saying that the number is so small because Indonesian workers are all happy and satisfied, their salaries paid on time, and if they are dismissed, their severance pay properly paid.[30]

Perhaps the most telling figure that best reflects public confidence in the courts is litigation that is truly voluntary, where Indonesians go to court of their own free choice to secure their individual rights (contractual claims, torts, etc.).[31] Only 17,529 contentious civil disputes were filed in 2008 for the whole of Indonesia,[32] and 17,258 in 2013.[33] And this tiny trickle of voluntary cases was filed despite the availability of 347 (in 2008)[34] and 352 (in 2011)[35] district courts.[36] No wonder a fair share of the district courts report not getting any cases at all for the entire year – 20 courts in 2008.[37] What these figures most likely show is that when Indonesian citizens have a choice, they do not go to the courts to find justice.[38]

Such a number of voluntary civil cases is very small when compared with the number of micro, small, and medium enterprises in Indonesia, which according to the data compiled by the Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs reached 56,5 million in 2014.[39] Civil lawsuits heard and decided by all courts of general jurisdiction in Indonesia in 2013 count only 0,03% of the population group with the most potential to bring cases.[40] That number becomes even smaller when compared to the population of Indonesia that according to 2010 data released by the National Statistics Body (Badan Pusat Statistik/BPS) had reached 237,641,326 people.[41] The comparison percentage turns out to be even lower, down to 0,007%, when the number civil claims is measured against the size of the Indonesian population.[42]

The above figures could be more meaningful if they are collated with analogous data from other time periods to see the trends of increase or decrease, accompanied by analysis and hypotheses to explain changes and fluctuations in use of the courts. Tabulation and analysis of these figures may also lead us to interesting insights on the role of courts in Indonesia if done in comparison with similar circumstances in other countries.

There must be explanations for why the number of voluntary civil cases filed by Indonesians 20 years ago was significantly higher than it is now.[43] Even in the colonial period, Indonesians filed more than 30,000 voluntary civil cases in the colonial courts – twice the number currently filed, even though there were only about 45 million Indonesians at the time.[44] If we compare the above figures to country such as Australia, it is fair enough to say that all 230 million Indonesians in 2008, and 250 million of them in 2010, filed about as many voluntary cases as a single magistrate of other country would handle in a year.[45]

b. The number of appeals to the Supreme Court

In 2003, in the blueprint for the reform of Indonesian judiciary, the Supreme Court maintained that the high number of incoming appeal cases filed at the Supreme Court suggests and is driven partly by the lack of public confidence in the decisions of first instance and appellate courts.[46] Therefore, one could say that the profile of appeal cases of either cassation or civil review (peninjauan kembali/PK) that are coming to the Supreme Court could indicate to a certain extent the level of public confidence in the courts, particularly in the decisions of the preceding level of courts.

In 2008, out of 13,543 cases that were decided by all appellate level courts in Indonesia, 11,338 went on to the Supreme Court.[47] This means that cassations were filed on 80% of the appeal court rulings in Indonesia.[48] Similar figures can also be found in the data for prior (2007) or subsequent (2009) years. In 2007, there were 12,258 cases decided by high courts in Indonesia from all jurisdictions.[49] In the same year, a total of 9,524 cases went on to cassation.[50] When these numbers are compared, one can see that in 2007 cassations were filed on 77,6% of the appeal courts’ rulings.[51] In 2009, the number of appellate decisions was 14,431 and there were 12,210 cassation cases. This comes up with a larger percentage of appeal, i.e. 84,6%.[52]

There was slight decline in this percentage comparison in 2013, although not significant enough to demonstrate any new trend. The Supreme Court annual report reveals that in 2013 there were 13,640 decisions made by all appellate courts in Indonesia, while at the same time there were 9,799 incoming cassation cases.[53] If all cassation cases filed in 2013 are assumed to derive from cases decided at the appellate level in the same year, it can be said that of 71% of appellate court rulings resulted in cassation filings at the Supreme Court.

In addition to cassation cases, civil review cases can also be referred to as another indication of the level of public confidence in the courts. In their research on case limitation supported by NLRP in 2010, a leading judicial reform NGO, the Institute for the Independence of the Judiciary (Lembaga Kajian & Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan/LeIP) learned that more than 90% of incoming civil review cases over a number of years were filed against the Supreme Court’s cassation decisions.[54] The rest, or about 10% of civil review cases, were filed against the decisions of first instance and appellate courts.[55] On average, between 2004-2008 (5 consecutive years), the percentage of incoming civil review cases filed against cassation decisions was 90,43%.[56]

When studied in more detail, of all the civil review cases filed at the Supreme Court, the majority were based on claims of judges’ mistakes or manifest errors in judgments.[57] Such claims fall very close to the possible considerations justice seekers would make that relate to their confidence in the courts and judges, particularly when it comes to their evaluation of the competence of judges and the courts. The number of applications for civil review reached 73,79% within 5 years between 2004-2008.[58] Only 15,67% of civil review cases in this period were based on the presence of novum (newly discovered determinant evidence that at the time of previous case examination was not known), while the remainder were based on other considerations.[59]

The appeals information can not necessarily be relied on completely in explaining public confidence in the courts, given that there are other factors that need to be considered to understand the high number of appeals. This includes litigation strategies used by the parties, which are usually facilitated by their advocates, as well as loose limitations on appeals. Nevertheless, this information can serve as a partial indicator of the level of confidence (and satisfaction) of justice seekers in court decisions or the lack thereof that serves as one of the factors motivating litigants to file legal actions (upaya hukum).

c. Potential domain of the courts

Many parties, particularly judges, believe that one of the main functions of the court is to loosen the tensions that exists in society as a result of a variety of (potential) conflicts, by channeling them to the dispute settlement mechanisms, in order to prevent the use of force (kekerasan) in sorting out the conflicts. The judiciary and its adjudication processes serve a pluralistic democratic society, not only as an independent and as impartial forum for the struggle between conflicting interests and values but also to contribute to the maintenance of the legal order and the public domain in general.[60]

National System for Violence Monitoring (Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan/SNPK), a central database managed by the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare of the Republic of Indonesia, in its monthly report in January 2014, released data on the prevalence of violence in 13 areas, including Aceh, Greater Jakarta (Jabodetabek), West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, West Papua, Central Sulawesi, Lampung and West Nusa Tenggara.[61] The data showed that from January 2013 to December 2013, there were at least 9,349 violent incidents recorded in the 13 regions above.[62] The highest number was contributed by the incidence of crimes amounted to 5,536.[63] But the number of violent incidents categorized as vigilantism (main hakim sendiri) was also significant, reaching 1,208, in addition to domestic violence (772), and conflicts over resources (332).[64]

Staggered analysis of course can be done to better understand this information. Besides the violence of the crimes, which are defined by SNPK as “actions that occur in the absence of neither previously disputed conflicts nor specific targets”, the high incidence of violence indicate that public confidence in the formal dispute resolution system (particularly the courts) has not been able to replace their preference for solving problems by violent means. To support this approach in analyzing the information, a recent doctoral thesis at the Leiden University partially confirmed that an improved public confidence in the justice system (courts), helps to reduce the potentials for the use of violent means by the public in solving their conflicts.[65]

The need for the courts to resolve disputes that arise in the community can also be reflected from the use of various alternative channels to find solutions to the legal problems they are facing. One of these conduits of public complaints against public services provided by various government entities was managed by the presidential delivery unit (Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan & Pengendalian Pembangunan/UKP4).[66] One of their publications points out that until May 2013, the online application for public complaints and aspirations (Layanan Aspirasi dan Pengaduan Online Rakyat/Lapor!) that is connected to more than 80 ministries and non-ministerial agencies, as well as several local governments, received 62,527 reports submitted by 22,954 members of the public, being the users of the application. The publication also highlights that 53% of the received complaints were successfully settled, while the other 25% were claimed to be in the follow-up process, and only 22% were not yet processed.[67]

Given the substance of the complaints, which generally are on governmental or state agency actions in implementing development programs and providing public services, it can be said that the domain of complaints settlement channel managed by UKP4 limitedly coincides with the domain of the courts, especially the administrative court. But through comparison of the number of the utilization of the channels by the community alone, a generic conclusion on which one is getting more confidence from the public can be effected.

Finding the causes

If we can agree that the symptoms discussed above can be recognized as signs of problems in public confidence in the courts, then the next step to be taken is to find the causes. Justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done. Public confidence is built by various public perceptions that emerge and live in the community about the courts. The more positive the perceptions are, the greater confidence can be expected from the public towards the court. But if the perceptions are predominantly negative, the public trust needed by the courts is at stake. Therefore, it is important to diagnose the diverse and growing perceptions in the community about the courts through appropriate sources of information.

The most rich, complete, and up-to-date source of data is media spotlight. Everywhere, not only in Indonesia, including in the Netherlands, the judiciary and adjudication are the subjects of permanent attention by the media. The attention of the media towards the court in Indonesia has been augmented recently following the improved transparency of decisions promoted by the Supreme Court through its successful efforts to make the full texts of court decisions available to the public online. Many times, not only bad news, but positive appreciation towards individual judges or the court institutionally can be obtained from media exposure. However, anticipation should be made on the potential bias of certain media, especially when they have, either directly or indirectly, interests in particular outcomes from the coverage. The proper strategy in overcoming this issue is by referring to different newspapers, magazines, and electronic media as references, so their reportage can be cross-checked one against the another, and by being aware of the important role of local media, which occasionally have more direct connections to the source of the news and their audiences.

The next important data source is public statements by opinion makers from NGOs and academics, particularly those who focus on law and justice sector issues. This data usually coincides with the media news, as most of public opinions broadcast by media are still heavily influenced by the views of opinion makers, who generally are NGO activists and academics. However, more comprehensive data containing assessment, observation, and opinion on the performance and standing of the courts can many times be obtained directly from a variety of year-end reports, books, position papers, working papers, writings, or media releases published by organizations and scholars following legal and judicial reform efforts or studying the judiciary and the legal system.

Complaints made by justice seekers or litigants, either those that are channeled through alternative means such as letters to the editor or blogs, or submitted through official supervision outlets, can also be a source of useful data in identifying the public perception of the court. Let us take a look at complaints handled by the Judicial Commission. Based on its 2013 annual report, the number of public complaints on judicial conduct received directly by the Judicial Commission in 2013 amounted to 2,193.[68] The annual report states that out of 2,193 incoming public complaints, 230, or 10.48% of the complaints fall outside the authority of the Judicial Commission.[69] The majority of complaints are related to questions on the professionalism of judges (as the term used in the KEPPH), which reached 775 reports, or approximately 35% of all incoming reports.[70] The data of course tells a lot about the estimation of the judiciary in the eyes of the complainants. The reports handled by the Supervisory Body (Badan Pengawasan) of the Supreme Court or other relevant oversight mechanism (such as the National Ombudsman, etc.) could be read likewise.

The next data source is opinion and satisfaction surveys. In many countries, this kind of survey is carried out by the courts by themselves, or by third parties in cooperation with the courts, although more independent surveys are also numerous and tend to be regarded as more reliable. In Indonesia, the tendency to do this kind of survey to gauge public perceptions of and satisfaction with the services of the courts has been increasing over time. One of them is a user satisfaction survey on public services in courts that was conducted recently by a leading law reform NGO (Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia/PSHK) in cooperation with Badan Pengawasan and supported by the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) in 2013.[71] The survey was carried out towards 1,546 court users as respondents in 12 different cities in Indonesia and disclosed that 45% of the respondents were satisfied with the services of the courts, 41% were adequately satisfied, and 14% expressed their dissatisfaction.[72]

A more independent survey carried out by Hiil, (an advisory and research institute for the justice sector, based in The Hague), in cooperation with the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and supported by the Open Society Justice Initiative, can be posited as another example.[73] The survey, which was titled “Justice Needs in Indonesia in 2014”, involved 2,400 respondents from 5 provinces in Indonesia.[74] The report contains estimates of potential needs of Indonesians towards effective dispute resolution mechanisms. The findings of the survey indicate the expected demand for justice. According to the survey, currently there are (at least) between 6 and 9 million victims of crime who need advice, support and assistance.[75] Between 2 and 4 million people are involved in land disputes, besides 1.5-3 million who are involved in money related disputes.[76] The findings also estimates that as much as 1.4-2.9 million Indonesians are involved in neighbors’ disputes as well as another 1.18-2.5 million involved in family disputes.[77]

Another initiatives include the state of law index survey conducted by the Indonesian Legal Roundtable (ILR) in collaboration with the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia/LSI), which in the very latest version asked for the opinion of hundreds of experts in different fields on the state of the rule of law in Indonesia, including the state of the judiciary[78] as well as, the survey on the integrity of public institutions that is regularly held by the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK), which in 2013 listed the Supreme Court as ranking the highest among 8 other institutions in terms of the integrity of its administration with an average score of 7,10.[79]

Statements by members of the judiciary in various official forums, such as in many of the public fit and proper tests during the selection process for Supreme Court justices, both those that are held in front of the Judicial Commission and before the law commission of Parliament, can sometimes offer interesting information shedding light on public perceptions of judicial performance. Even candidates who are career judges often reveal issues of public confidence during their tests, including things which may either represent their own views and observations, or the views held by the community that they have been able to record during their career in the bench.

Court decisions may also contain a great deal of opinions of the judges on the performance of other judges, particularly those whose decisions happened to be under their review, as well as the performance of their institution. A good example was the decision at the civil review level of the case between Bank America National Trust Company; Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, et.al.; PT. Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Tbk; and the Depository Trust Company, et.al.[80] The decision composed by Mariana Sutadi, Harifin Tumpa, and Paulus Lotulung (all of whom were highly respected justices), sheds light on their aspirations on the importance of chamber system, the need for a strong expertise background for judges in handling cases, and the criticism towards weaknesses flaunted by the judges at the preceding level in constructing their arguments.[81]

As far as this preliminary study concerns, the depicted perceptions derived from these various sources of data and other possible sources of data –that may be further identified and analysed– are as follows:

a. Perceptions on the cost of the judicial process

To litigate in the courts, especially in civil cases, incurs significant costs. Merely to file a lawsuit, official fees set by government regulation on non-tax revenues, decisions of the Chief Justice on court fees, and the determination of the respective Chief Judge on the advance payment of court fees, can average nearly IDR 1 million.[82] This does not include the costs of seizure, field examination, and execution (if required), for which the official charges may become significantly higher.[83] Not to mention the costs if the case should go through appeal or cassation, where each stage requires additional fees.[84] The perceptions on costly court proceedings are usually compounded and tend to be mixed up with the cost to hire a lawyer. People still tend to generalize the view that the cost for a lawyer is part of the costs to be incurred in the trial.

b. Perceptions on the integrity of the judicial process

Perceptions on the integrity of the judicial process were one of the findings of the survey conducted by the Indonesian Legal Roundtable in 2013 by interviewing experts in various provinces throughout Indonesia.[85] In the opinion of 56% of the interviewed experts, the independence of judges in deciding the case was found in only a few cases.[86] As many as 17% of the experts regarded the judges as not independent in most cases, and 5% of them gave the opinion that judges are not independent in all cases.[87] The factor considered to detract the most from the independence of judges is corruption.[88]

c. Perceptions on the consistency of court decisions

The consistency of court decisions is still an issue in Indonesia. There is shared perception that in some cases, the same type of cases can be decided quite differently, not only by different courts, but also sometimes by the same court, or even the same judge.[89] The lack of consistency has certainly become the target of public criticism, as expectations on how a case is decided, which should have referred to the earlier decisions on the same type of case, are not easy to be placated.

d. Perceptions on timeliness

Actually, there are rules and guidelines on how long it should take for a case to be resolved by the courts.[90] However, the ability of judges to follow these rules and guidelines varies, let alone the consequences of failure to adhere to stipulated time limits have not been made clear and unequivocal. Cases settlement will be perceived too long if parties takes the appeal, cassation, or civil review mechanism. It will take extra time for the decision to be enforced.

e. Perceptions on the actual resolution of disputes

It is a collective concern that when a judgment is obtained, the legal problem may still not be able to be resolved, considering the difficulties in the enforcement of the judgment. In addition to the official execution costs that are already high, challenges to the execution of a court decision will make the actual execution costs become even higher and the time to be longer. The situation is aggravated by the behavior of some state officials ignoring court rulings that have ordered corrections to their policies. This bad example of course further erodes public confidence in the ability of the courts to actually solve their problems.

f. Perceptions on the quality of public services

One aspect of public service by the courts that is frequently complained about is the scheduling of hearings. Many people complain about hearing schedules that may be delayed by a few hours or even by days, not only the justice seekers, but also attorneys or prosecutors, or the parties presented as witnesses. Indeed, the contributing parties may not only be the judges, it could be prosecutors or other parties, but the court is seen as the ultimate authority to control the proceedings of a case. The community also often feels the minimal court facilities are also troublesome, ranging from the limited number and quality of courtrooms up to the poor basic facilities such as waiting rooms and toilets.[91] The problem will become more serious when the attention is directed to the facilities for those with special needs such as women and persons with disabilities.[92] The view that the court is an uninviting public institution is still felt by many people.

g. Perceptions on commitment to reform

Despite the many reform measures undertaken by the Supreme Court and the lower courts, and although wide international recognition has been received for the reform measures taken by the Supreme Court, the public appreciation in Indonesia is still overshadowed by the unfavorable aspects of litigation that continue to diminish the credibility of the courts. The negative aspect most frequently raised is unethical behavior of court personnel, particularly when the court as an institution does not properly respond to the grievances. The other is when there is organizational practices or institutional decisions taken which are not in line with the aspirations of the public.

Conclusions and recommendations

From various exposures above, what needs to be done subsequently by the Supreme Court is to become more institutionally open to various inputs that carry messages on diverse and growing perceptions in the society about the courts. The Supreme Court has already developed many modalities for this. Leaders of the Supreme Court since the reform era have a proven commitment to reform.

The next step is to determine a group or working unit at the Supreme Court to be coordinated directly by the Chief Justice that will consistently map and record various public perceptions of the courts on regular basis. The perceptions set forth above are of course dynamic, as various efforts to reform the courts are also dynamic. The perceptions may also not yet be complete, or may have changed in terms of the level of relevance between one to another. Therefore, the determined unit needs to identify the various valid sources of data to gain insights on acceptance of the courts in the eyes of the public, including their dynamics. If necessary, this unit will have to stand in for the Supreme Court to cooperate, or even provide support, to parties who manage various data sources, to help maintain the continuity and sustainability of their initiatives, while maintaining their objectivity and critical nature.

More broadly, the reintroduction of the importance of public confidence in the judiciary should start to be encouraged massively, as well as the aspirational and practical benefits for the courts to be able to rely on a high level of public confidence. The Supreme Court also needs to direct all of its units to be more sensitive to public perceptions and turn them into indicators for any act and policy taken. In doing so, it is important for the Supreme Court to emphasize the call for the sensitivity to public aspirations to be manifested substantively, and not to be trapped in the hazard of mere “image building” (pencitraan). Indonesian democracy has taught good lessons that substantive endeavors to garner public confidence always come up with longer and “never betraying” popular support.

Institutionally, it is the time for the Supreme Court to start the both logical and empirical analysis process to diagnose “who”, either internally or externally, and “what” the behaviors are that contribute directly or indirectly to the negative or positive public perceptions. Doing quick responses to correct any problematic behaviors of the internal members of the court (particularly for those that are not related to ongoing cases) is inevitable. Communicating these responses, and other reform measures that have been taking place in the Supreme Court to the public, including their aspirational and practical benefits for the society is also essential. The Supreme Court needs sound expertise and solid teams in the field of public relations in order to facilitate the institution-mass communication processes, which can be very complex and tiring.

At the same time, the Supreme Court needs to be more systematic in impersonalizing the diagnosed problematic behaviors, and further makes every behavior as the target of a further comprehensive analysis to pinpoint its various roots, which can be legal and extra legal. It should be underlined that problematic behaviors may not be corrected nor changed without removing the roots of the problem. Once the roots of the problem are identified, what would be proper solutions and what their alternatives are should be sought for and worked on immediately.

Making the outputs of the above comprehensive assessment exercise, led directly by the Chief Justice and other top ranking members of the Court leadership, as the direction of the various reform programs, need to be announced as a priority agenda for the Supreme Court. The direct involvement of the top leaders is aimed at intensifying the magnitude of the conveyed messages, guaranteeing proper follow up in the form of institutional actions and policies, as well as balancing comparable efforts in attaining public confidence and support as what is demonstrated by other state and government institutions following since the reform era.

It may be that the above outputs have been represented in prevailing reform documents, but their orientation to increase public confidence, should be warranted. At the least, the outputs of the above assessment process can serve as reliable media to evaluate whether the specific reform strategy, approach, and program that is already running has contributed to eradicating the negative perceptions that arise and flourish in society about the courts. Those perceptions are significant factors that will eventually play a part in the formation of public confidence, or in other words, the perceptions identified by this paper as the important elements of public confidence in the court.

It is definitely a good time for enhanced public confidence to be determined as the ultimate goal of the Supreme Court in particular and the courts in general. Because as noted in the strong statements of respectable people cited in the first part of this paper, there is no doubt that public confidence will serve as the groundwork for the Supreme Courts and all the lower courts to realize supreme justice (peradilan yang agung), as recently envisioned as the goal of the Indonesian judiciary.

* Published at Kadafi, Binziad. (2015). “Impotant Elements of Public Confidence in the Courts: The Indonesian Case (a Preliminary Study)”. Jentera Law Journal. 24, VII, May-August 2015, 14-33. The article is developed from a paper presented by the author at the Indonesia Netherlands Legal Update 2014, The Hague, 20-21 November 2014. The author would like to thank Gregory Churchill for his valuable comments and suggestions.

[1] Roscoe Pound, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” Address before the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association (Aug. 29,1906), J. Am. Jud. Soc. 20 (1936): 178.

[2] Roger K. Warren, “Public Trust and Procedural Justice,” American Judges Association Court Review 37, no. 3 (2000): 12–16.

[3] The Federalist No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).

[4] Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and Procedural Justice, Court Review-Fall 2000, p. 16.

[5] E. Norman Veasey, “The Many Facets of Judicial Independence Diamond,” QLR 20 (2000): 779.

[6] Marc A. Loth, “Courts in a Quest for Legitimacy: A Comparative Approach,” in The Legitimacy of Highest Courts’ Rulings: Judicial Deliberations and Beyond (The Hague, The Netherlands: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2009), pp. 267–88.

[7] Remarks of Chief Justice Harifin A. Tumpa at the close of the National Working Meeting of the Indonesian Supreme Court, Jakarta, 21 September 2011.

[8] Id., at p. 12.

[9] Id., at p. 13.

[10] Id., at p. 25.

[11] Veasey, op. cit., at 780.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Joint Decree of the Chief Justice of the Republic of Indonesia and the Chairman of the Judicial Commission of the Republic of Indonesia no: 047/KMA/SKB/IV/2009, no: 02/SKB/P.KY/IV/2009 on Judicial Code of Ethic and Code of Conduct.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] “Ketua MA Hatta Ali: Kita Bukan Apa-apa Tanpa Kepercayaan Publik,” Detik.com, 01 November 2012.

[20] Id.

[21] Republik Indonesia, Mahkamah Agung, Sambutan Ketua Mahkamah Agung RI pada Pelantikan Ketua Pengadilan Tingkat Banding, (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung RI, 27 Desember 2012), p. 4.

[22] Id.

[23] “KY Nilai Problem Serius MA Adalah Rendahnya Kepercayaan Publik”, Detik.com, 13 August 2014.

[24] The courts, however, must be recognized as one of the few state institutions that has most widely introduced and tried to apply a variety of reform initiatives to improve performance.

[25] Binziad Kadafi, “A Letter to President Elect, Former Furniture Salesman”, Jakarta Post, 15 September 2014, p. 7.

[26] Id.

[27] Republik Indonesia, Mahkamah Agung, Laporan Tahunan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia Tahun 2013 (Supreme Court Annual Report of 2013), (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung RI, 2014, 323 pp), at p. 67 & p. 146.

[28] Id.

[29] Id., at p.63.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Muhammad Faiz Aziz et.al., Buku Statistik Penegakan Hukum 2008, Law Enforcement Statistics 2008, (Jakarta: Pusat Data Peradilan, 2010), p. 120, in id. The Law Enforcement Statistics of 2007 and 2008 were developed and published under the support of the Indonesia Netherlands National Legal Reform Program (NLRP).

[33] Republik Indonesia, Mahkamah Agung, op. cit. at p. 62.

[34] Muhammad Faiz Aziz et.al., op. cit, p. 4.

[35] Muhammad Faiz Aziz, Sebuah Penilaian atas Website Pengadilan tahun 2011, an Assessment of Court Websites 2011, (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia, 2012), p.12, in id. This website assessment was a follow up to similar initiatives conducted with the support of NLRP and published by PT Tatanusa in 2010.

[36] Id.

[37] Muhammad Faiz Aziz et.al., Buku…, op. cit., p. 163.

[38] Id.

[39] http://www.antaranews.com/berita/416949/menkop-jumlah-koperasi-dan-umkm-terus-meningkat accessed on 7 September 2014 in Binziad Kadafi, Reformasi Peradilan dan Problematika Penegakan Hukum di Indonesia, a paper presented in general lecture at Sharia & Law Faculty of State Islamic University of Sunan Gunung Djati, Bandung, 10 September 2014, p. 2.

[40] Id.

[41] http://www.bps.go.id/eng/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&id_subyek=12 accessed on 6 September 2014, in id.

[42] Id.

[43] Id.

[44] Id.

[45] Id.

[46] Republik Indonesia, Mahkamah Agung, Cetak Biru Pembaruan Peradilan, (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung RI, 2003), p. 183.

[47] Lembaga Kajian & Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan, Konsep Ideal Peradilan Indonesia, (Jakarta: Lembaga Kajian & Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan, 2010), p. 10.

[48] Id.

[49] Rifqi Sjarief Assegaf et.al., Pembatasan Perkara, Strategi Mendorong Peradilan cepat, Murah, Efisien dan Berkualitas, (Jakarta: Lembaga Kajian & Advokasi untuk Independensi Peradilan, 2010), p. 14.

[50] Id.

[51] Id.

[52] Id.

[53] Republik Indonesia, Mahkamah Agung, Laporan…, op. cit., at p. 17 & p. 59.

[54] Rifqi Sjarief Assegaf et.al., op. cit., at p. 49.

[55] Id.

[56] Id.

[57] Id., at p. 51.

[58] Id.

[59] Id., at p. 50-51.

[60] Marc A. Loth, Staying Out of Court? Reservations about a Supposed Practice and a Popular Policy, Erasmus Law Review Volume 01 Issue 05, p. 116-117.

[61] Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat RI, Sistem Nasional Pemantauan Kekerasan, Laporan Bulanan Januari 2014, (Jakarta: Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat RI , 2014), p. 4.

[62] Id., at p. 5.

[63] Id.

[64] Id.

[65] Nicole Eveline Haas, “Public Support for Vigilantism” (Leiden University, 2010), p. 64.

[66] UKP4 was established under the second term of the administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, exactly on 9 December 2014, based on Presidential Regulation (Peraturan Presiden) No. 54 of 2009. President Joko Widodo formally dissolved the institution on 23 February 2015, through the issuance of Peraturan Presiden No. 26 of 2015.

[67] Info Lapor@! Edisi #02 Mei 2013.

[68] Republik Indonesia, Komisi Yudisial, Laporan Tahunan Komisi Yudisial Republik Indonesia 2013, (Jakarta: Komisi Yudisial RI, 2014, 108 pp.), p. 16.

[69] Id., at p. 17.

[70] Id.

[71] Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia, Laporan Baseline Survey Pelayanan Publik Pengadilan, Survey Kepuasan Pengadilan 2013, (Jakarta: Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia, 2014), p. 296.

[72] Id., at p. 296.

[73] HiiL, “Justice Needs in Indonesia 2014: Problems, Processes and Fairness” (HiiL, 2014).

[74] Id., at p. 3.

[75] Id., at p. 27.

[76] Id.

[77] Id.

[78] Andri Gunawan et.al., Indeks Negara Hukum Indonesia 2013, (Jakarta: Indonesian Legal Roundtable, 2014).

[79] Direktorat Penelitian & Pengembangan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, Survei Integritas Sektor Publik 2013

Fakta Korupsi dalam Layanan Publik Pusat dan Vertikal, (Jakarta: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, 16 Desember 2013), pp. 37-38.

[80] Decision of Mahkamah Agung Nomor 445PK/PDT/2007 year 2007, accessed through http://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/putusan/f5e93cf7b279ff2a378d16b5192f3539.

[81] Id.

[82] Government Regulation (PP) No. 53/2008 concerning Types and Tariffs on Non-Tax State Revenues Applicable in the Supreme Court and Lower Courts and Supreme Court Letter No. 42/WKMA.NY/IX/2008 on Guidelines for the Implementation of PP 53/2008.

[83] According to Article 182 of the Code of Civil Procedure (HIR), civil cases are dealt with in a limited 7 components of costs of court proceedings which include the cost of the inspection, the cost of summons of the parties, etc.

[84] Decree of the Chief Justice No. KMA/42/SK/III/2002 stipulated that the cost of cassation in general civil, civil religion, and administrative cases was increased to IDR 500 thousand from initially IDR 200 thousand. The cost of civil review (PK) was also raised to IDR 2.5 million from IDR 500 thousand. The Decree was replaced by Supreme Court Regulation (Peraturan Mahkamah Agung/Perma) No. 3 of 2012, although the costs of case handling are predominantly maintained.

[85] Gunawan et.al., op. cit., at 36.

[86] Id.

[87] Id.

[88] Id.

[89] One former Supreme Court justice was alleged by attorneys of deciding two cases with similar substance differently. In one case he was alleged to prohibit prosecutors to apply for review, but in the other case he allowed review by prosecutors. Hukumonline, 24 July 2012.

[90] The latest guidelines issued were Circular Letter of the Supreme Court No. 2 of 2014 on case settlement in the courts of first instance and appellate courts, and Chief Justice Decree No. 214 of 2014 on time period of case handling at the Supreme Court.

[91] The baseline survey on public services in courts concluded that the 50% of court users are adequately satisfied over court facility, only 29% are satisfied, while the rest (21%) express their dissatisfaction. See Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia, op. cit., at 43.

[92] The survey highlighted that the assessment of the quality of the existing facilities in accommodating the needs of people with disability is poor.” The survey added that lack of infrastructure support; such as ramp or visual instruction is a clear indication to the finding. Id., at 293.

Download pdf here 2015-07-06 Binziad Kadafi “Important Elements of Public Confidence in the Court”